LETTER TO THE GJIROKAstra REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA ON THE STAND TOWARDS BRITISH MILITARY MISSIONS

August 16, 1943

A British major is coming there, assigned to the Gjirokastra region. Such people come on their own business, of course, and also to poke their noses into our internal affairs. They do not keep their promises to supply us with weapons and money. They have a tendency to enquire about every person, every partisan, and every unit commander, and thus find out about the situation and meddle in the affairs of our army and our movement. We should place some good comrades at their service to accompany them, avoiding meetings with people you think they should not meet. Give as little information as possible about our internal affairs!

Comradely regards

Shpati

Works, vol. 1.

1 Since May 1943 representatives of the British-US Mediterranean Command came uninvited to Albania as allegedly dictated by the interests of the war against the Hitlerites. In words, they undertook to aid the Albanian National Liberation Army with weapons and equipment. But their ends were chiefly political. They were engaged in undermining the National Liberation War, and in supporting and aiding all reactionary forces. The CPA saw in this interference a danger to the achievement of revolution and independence, and maintained a resolute stand towards it.
LETTER FROM THE CC OF THE CPA TO THE
VLORA REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPA
ON SETTING UP THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY OF ALBANIA, ON
THE TALKS WITH THE “BALLI KOMBÎTAR”
AND THE DENUNCIATION OF YMER
DISHNICA’S OPPORTUNISM
IN MUKJÉ

August 17, 1943

Comrade S. has informed us about the situation of the
organization and the army in your region, and we hope
that as far as the organization is concerned, you will obtain
good results through determination and persistent work.
Concerning the army, we congratulate you on the forma-
tion of the zone staff and the commencement of its activity.
This will be one of our guarantees for the strengthening
of our army and our influence.

Five days ago we sent you a circular1 informing you
of the distribution in Tirana of a leaflet, which will have
been sent to you for printing. The circular explains how
you should act in this matter. I shall give you some ex-

1 This circular condemns the agreement reached at the Mukjé
meeting of Ymer Dishnica and Mustafa Gjinishi with the chiefs
of the “Ballî” as running counter to the orientations issued by
the CC of the CPA. Through this circular the CC orders the
Party to reject the leaflet signed by the “Committee for the Sal-
vation of Albania”, in which the points of the treacherous Mukjé
agreement were included.
planations so that you understand clearly how this came about, where it originated, and what counter-measures should be taken. I have not written to you about the development of the talks in Peza; this is a shortcoming, but the reason is that we have been very busy. The formation of the 1st Brigade, the first steps in our work with the staff, the party work in the Korça sector, and the time taken in travelling have prevented me from writing to you. A meeting was held in Labinot of all the members of the General Council with the exception of Kamber Qafmolla and Ndoci Çoba who were afraid to come. Having examined the situation, this meeting decided to set up a General Staff, with Spiro Moisiu as commander, Enver Hoxha as commissar, and the following members: Abaz Kupi, Myslim Peza, Baba Faja, Haxhi Lleshi, Baca (Ramadan Çitaku), Ymer Dishnica, Sejfulla Malëshova, Mustafa Gjinishi, Bedri Spahiu, Dali Ndreu... There were discussions on the enlargement of the National Liberation General Council, and the former council was unanimously approved, while Sejfulla Malëshova and Haxhi Lleshi were co-opted. The Council elected its presidium which was charged with the task of organizing a broad conference to elect a wider council, including other elements who have proved themselves during a year of war. There was discussion on the subversive attitude of the “Balli”, and on this issue we were all of one mind and our decision was unanimous. Only Abaz Kupi raised some objections concerning the star, claiming that the people did not like this emblem, and so forth. He added that he personally was not at all opposed to the use of the star, “for”, he said, “you have consecrated it with your blood

\[2\] The meeting of the General Council held in July 4, 1943.

\[3\] Later on he deserted and collaborated with the German occupiers.
and sacrifices. You can put it anywhere else, except on the flag". Following some discussion, we reached agreement. We explained to Abaz Kupi that it was not the people who had raised the question of the star, but the Ballists, whose aims we know so well, and that we cannot remove it merely to please the Ballists. We can discuss it with them when they have entered the war and have shed their blood in the battles against the invader, and not when they are fighting as at present, mainly against us, and not at all against the invader. Bazi accepted our reasoning. It was also decided to make another appeal to the "Balli," and to invite some of its chiefs so as to tell them frankly the aim and the decision of the National Liberation General Council. We appointed our delegates to hold discussions with them, and these were: Bazi i Canës, Myslim⁴, Ymer⁵, Mustafa Gjinishi and Kamber Qafmolla, provided he accepted the position of the Council on all that was decided in Labinot. We also fixed the points on which the talks with the "Balli" should be based.

These points were: the "Balli Kombëtar" must cease fighting the councils and immediately join actively in the liberation war, and not only in words; it must agree to take part in the national liberation councils and to attend a broad conference including, besides the National Liberation Council and the "Balli", a great many other honest patriots. At the same time, the "Balli" should expel from its ranks compromising elements such as Ali Këlcyra and company⁶. In particular, we stressed to Ymer Dishnica

⁴ Myslim Peza.
⁵ Ymer Dishnica.
⁶ One of the heads of the traitorous "Balli Kombëtar" organization. In March 1943, authorized by the "Central Committee" of the "Balli", he and the commander of the Italian fascist troops of occupation, R. Dalmazzo, signed a secret protocol, which envisaged the coordination of actions against the national liberation forces.
and Mustafa Gjinishi the stand they should take as communists, knowing full well what the “Balli” and its manoeuvres were, and what game it was playing.

Ten days after we left Labinot, we received the first letter from Ymer which in essence goes like this: In the course of a first meeting\(^7\) with Lumo Skëndo and Hasan Dosti\(^8\), after much discussion and hesitation on their part, it was decided to record the conclusions of these negotiations in minutes which were signed by both parties; here are the main points noted by Ymer in his letter (I am putting them down word for word, because they are of great importance):

I. Immediate war against the fascist invader.

II. Both organizations accept the basic idea of forming a joint committee called the “COMMITTEE FOR THE SALVATION OF ALBANIA”.

III. Fight for a genuinely free, independent and democratic Albania.

IV. The committee has as its program the liberation of the Albania of 1913; as for the other zones inhabited by Albanians, it claims the universal right of self-determination of people, guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter.

In his letter, Ymer dwelt at length on his opinions and remarks on the “Balli” men, pointing out the manoeuvres of the “Balli”, which is trying “to enter history without fighting”, “to take the reins of the movement”, etc. Then, he adds his own comment that “events are developing quickly”, that “the fall of the Duce will have great repercussions”, “the whole world is in a fever”, “they too are all feverish”, etc., etc. He did not even finish this letter, for

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\(^7\) The first meeting with the chiefs of the “Balli Kombëtar” took place on July 26, 1943.

\(^8\) Representative of the “Balli Kombëtar”, war criminal in the National Liberation War, fled abroad where he headed for a while a reactionary organization at the service of the Anglo-Americans.
he went to meet the “Balli” delegates in a village of Dajti. This was the content of the letter, and we understood nothing, either from this letter or from the discussions of which he speaks, to enable us to help him. We saw only four bare points of which the second was obscure, but nevertheless existed in the minutes, while there is no mention at all in the letter of the points we had decided upon in Labinot, though they should have been discussed. Since the time we had specified for their stay there was over, and the result of the first letter he sent us was insignificant, we wrote that they should come back.

We have received a second letter from Ymer, the essence of which is: At the second meeting with the “Balli” their reckoning was complicated mainly by two points: first “ethnic Albania” and the proclamation of independence, and second, the abrogation of the April 12 decision of the Assembly. “The first obstacle”, he writes, “that of ‘ethnic Albania’, has been surmounted through an ambiguous formula, similar to that I mentioned in the first letter”. “We surmounted the second obstacle,” Ymer goes on in his letter, “by leaving it in the hands of a definitive committee to be set up before August 8.” This is the content of the second letter and nothing more; nothing about distributing a leaflet, or even asking our opinion about the distribution of a leaflet; they merely said that we should move nearer to Tirana or send them the necessary directives before August 8.

9 The second meeting with the chiefs of the “Balli Kombetar” was held on August 1-2, 1943 in Mukje near Kruja.

10 On April 12, 1939, in order to cover up the annexation of Albania, the Italian fascists convened in Tirana the “Constituent Assembly” which sanctioned the “personal union” of Albania with Italy, proclaimed the Italian King, Victor Emmanuel III, King of Albania, and elected a puppet Albanian government headed by the big landowner and collaborationist Shefqet Vërliç.
We replied that we did not agree with what they were discussing, that this was not the time to proclaim the independence of Albania, but that first the “Balli” should declare war on Italy, that it was seeking through these manoeuvres to hide its murky past, and to annul the April 12 Assembly, and let it become a thing of the past because all the principal “Ballists” had taken part in it. On the other hand, we reminded them of the tasks which had been assigned to them and of the points they had been told to discuss, advising them not to go beyond these points. But they did not even wait for our reply and, on 6 and 7 August, circulated a leaflet in the name of the “Committee for the Salvation of Albania”, which speaks of everything except the war against fascism and what our Party is striving for. Instead, it speaks of the “fight for an independant, democratic and popular Albania”, of “the application of the principle of self-determination of the people, universally recognized and guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter”, and of the struggle for an “ethnic Albania”. To us, this leaflet represented a capitulation to the “Balli”, for it wiped off all our efforts and our war, ignored the national liberation councils and the slogans with which we led and inspired the war, while on the other hand, the “Balli”, which has committed so many infamous deeds, emerged as the saviour of Albania. Following the publication of that leaflet, we sent to all party organizations the circular which you have no doubt received and acted upon.

This, of course, will have repercussions in our work; we should by no means agree to fall in line with the position dictated by the “Balli” and accepted by the Doctor. Nor shall we alter either the form or the name of the national liberation councils. We shall carry on the fight even more fiercely under the same slogans and under the banner of the National Liberation War. For these reasons,
the leaflet distributed in the name of the “Committee for
the Salvation of Albania” should be denounced, and as
for the question of uniting, we will unite only on the
terms we set out below:

1. — War against the fascist occupiers and all their
servants.

2. — Unity in the war, but not in a token war waged
with the aim of whitewashing former faults, so as to take
over the banner of the war and to sabotage it in another
way because the first way failed, but unity in a real,
fierce, and incessant war against the fascist occupiers and
traitors.

3. — In the course of this war, as defined in the pre-
ceding point, we shall achieve the formation of a joint
operational staff for all Albania, as well as operational
zone staffs.

4. — The national liberation councils are the state
power, which stems from the people and from the war;
they have been democratically elected by the people and
should be recognized by all as the people’s democratic
power.

5. — We are for an independent, democratic Albania,
in which the people themselves, after the war, will decide
the form of the regime.

6. — Respect for the Atlantic Charter, and the Lon-
don and Washington Treaties between the USSR, Great
Britain, and the United States; in connection with the
question of Kosova and Çamëria, this will be resolved
after the war by the Kosova and Çamëria population
themselves, who will decide their future according to
their wishes. We shall do our utmost to create a situation
in which this matter can be settled with complete justice.
Until fascism is wiped out, our main patriotic task is to
encourage and aid the population of Kosova and Çamëria
to engage in war against the occupiers and their servants,
for only thus can they guarantee their own existence and their right to self-determination.

7. — We are for a war fought jointly with all the political trends of the country which are in continuous, immediate and implacable struggle against the fascist occupiers and their servants.

8. — We do not collaborate with the "Balli Kombëtar" as an organization, as long as the "Balli" has in its ranks people who have connections with the occupiers, who sabotage the National Liberation War, who fight against the National Liberation Front and against the Communist Party, and as long as it retains criminals and bandits in its ranks.

9. — We collaborate with all those elements who have sided with the invader until now but have not committed crimes against the people, and who, from now on, pursue the genuine line of the war and abandon once and for all the erroneous positions they have been led into by the enemy propaganda.

It is impossible to tell you all our thoughts about the consequences and situations which might arise from this position. You should go into this deeply and draw conclusions yourselves; but we are advising you in general how to act as to do away with this state of affairs, and not only to do away with it, but to surmount it to our advantage; that is where our determination and ability as communists in the most difficult situations will appear.

The first thing to do is to strengthen the organization and not allow any vacillation or discontent to appear. You should do this by clearly explaining our correct line, and that it is the delegates, and not the Central Committee, who are responsible for this business; that one or two people may make mistakes, but not the Party, and it cannot permit its political line to be violated and distorted. On the other hand, the entire organization should be mobilized
Immediately and the Party should tighten its ranks. Broad and lively meetings should be organized with the population, to tell them our stand and that of the "Balli", unmasking all those who have resorted to intrigues and rotten trickery, and frankly seek from the people the opinion that we cannot collaborate with such individuals. For example: Ali Këlcyra has done this and that, he is a crook who has fought against the movement, he has compromised with the occupiers, and he is one of the "Balli" too; consequently, we cannot collaborate with the "Balli" until it has expelled such elements. On the basis of the points we have set out, we should tell the people that only in this way will we accept collaboration and unity. The councils, friends, party members, and sympathizers should be mobilized and set in motion. Re-read the first circular we sent you too, and act as we instruct you there, to strengthen the organization. Soon you will receive two leaflets which are to be duplicated and distributed throughout the region, and studied everywhere at meetings and conferences held with the population. One of these leaflets will be from the Central Committee in response to the accusations made against us by the "Balli", and the other, from the council, will explain our attitude to you even more clearly. You should inform Gjirokastra as soon as possible of our position, and they too should act in this way.

Concerning the question of the army, we shall write separately to the zone command from the General Staff. On the 15th of this month we celebrated the formation of the brigade, which was a huge success. More than one thousand people were present at the ceremony, and the parade was applauded with great enthusiasm by the population, and by all the councils of the region which had hastened to be present at the founding of the first
unit of our regular army. And, indeed, comrades, it looked like a regular army. There were many speeches and songs, then a great picnic was organized, where nothing was heard but songs, speeches, and hatred for the occupiers. This is an important date in the history of our movement. This example should be quickly followed by all regions.

Our friends, the allies, do not keep the promises they have made; they have dropped very few weapons, if any at all.

The situation in the regions is unchanged. The organization here has many shortcomings and great looseness. We hope that during the short time it stays here, the brigade will give an impetus to the work.

I am enclosing a letter, carried by a partisan of the brigade. You have eight hundred pounds that the Englishmen gave you; give five hundred to this partisan and help him to buy a quantity of grain, which should be stored for the 1st Brigade in the places indicated. These provisions should not be touched. Take the rest of the money to buy weapons, which should be kept at the disposal of the General Staff.

The telegraphist, who came once and went away again, should start immediately for the place he went to before; he should not come with the idea of going home again, for he is to stay here. When he reaches this destination, he should ask for Nexhip, who will direct him to the right place.

We have not yet met Dr. Ymer, but we will meet him shortly and inform you about this. Since we have not had a meeting of the Central Committee, please give us your opinion on everything we have written to you about; we intend to hold a meeting shortly, and will inform you of it in due time.
LETTER TO THE VLORA REGIONAL COMMITTEE

With my comradely greetings and those of all the comrades, and especially of Halim

Taras

After the error made by the Doctor the comrades of the CC are unanimous in their disapproval of the leaflet and of what the Doctor has done.

Taras

"Principal Documents of the PLA" vol. 1, Tirana 1960

11 Pseudonym of the Yugoslav internationalist communist Miladin Popovich, who, in autumn 1941, having been freed by the Albanian communists from a fascist concentration camp, remained in Albania to maintain links between the CPA and the CPY. He supported the internationalist stand of the CC of the CPA. In September 1944, on orders of the leadership of the CPY, he left Albania and in March 1945 was assassinated by the Yugoslav secret service.
REPORT TO THE 2nd NATIONAL LIBERATION CONFERENCE¹ (OF LABINOT) ON OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE DIFFERENT TRENDS OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

September 6, 1943

We have almost reached the final point which is of particular importance. I ask that we all remain cool-headed during the discussions over this point. Our comments should be short and to the point. Thus we shall keep this Conference at the proper level. I will not speak at length. The war began from the day fascist Italy occupied our lands. We began to defend our honour, our homeland and our history. At first, the struggle was passive resistance, then it gathered momentum and impetus. We wanted to unite around an ideal, around a flag. The war could not be waged by a solitary group, a minority, but had to be waged by all the people in unity. We did not achieve this at once.

¹ The 2nd National Liberation Conference was held at Labinot, Elbasan, from September 4 to 9, 1943. It took up as the main link the question of strengthening the people's democratic power. It approved the Constitution and the Rules of the national liberation councils and launched the slogan: "Recognition of the national liberation councils as the sole people's power in Albania." It elected the National Liberation General Council. It publicly denounced the Mukje agreement as an act contrary to the principles of the Peza Conference and decided to expose to the end the hostile activity of the "Balli Kombëtar".
The Communist Party was the only party to come out openly before the people, the only party to direct its members and cadres towards a single goal: the liberation of the country. The Communist Party was well aware that nothing could be done without the people. It began the war and united with the first patriots who had also understood that it must be waged. We united without distinction of religion or party. Each had faith in the other, and particularly in the communists, who had made great sacrifices. The war gained momentum. From the blood that was shed in the streets, the people understood that their forces were sufficient to prevent the fascists from oppressing them. The Communist Party, together with some nationalists, proceeding from one desire, one sacred aim, called the Peza Conference, to which numerous elements were invited. Among them there were some who were honest and unsullied. Some were sympathizers of Zog, and others had been members of various parties in 1924, but had not declared themselves openly before the people, such as Lumo Skëndo, Azis Çamî², Skënder Muço and Thoma Orollogaj, present representatives of the “Balli Kombëtar”. Lumo Skëndo sent a delegate. Abaz Ermeni was invited but did not come, or rather was not allowed, although he came to Tirana two days before. As for Skënder Muço, we agreed that he should come, but he did not come in time. At Peza it was decided to fight the occupiers without compromise, and to organize the national liberation councils as organs of the war. The bases for the war were laid. All honest people were to take part in these councils, which would be provisional. Later, these people would be replaced with members emerging from

² Later on he sided with the “Balli Kombëtar”, and with the advent of the German occupiers held talks with them on behalf of the “Balli” for the creation of a police troop against the revolutionary forces.
the war. The door would remain open to all political parties which might emerge. The units were to remain under the command of those who had set them up until the General Staff was created. Azis Çami and Skënder Muço arrived at the end of the Conference. Although the meeting had ended, the resolution was read to them, and they accepted it without objection.

The councils began to spring up. It was at that time that the "Balli Kombëtar" appeared. How did this organization present itself to the people? Its first leaflet gave the impression that it accepted the war against fascism. Through its representatives, the General Council invited the "Balli Kombëtar" to send delegates to take part in the Council. They declared that they did not recognize the Peza Conference because in their opinion it was a communist conference. But the Peza Conference was not a communist conference. They objected that the Party attended it in an organized way, while the nationalists did not. The fact is that Abaz Kupi, Baba Faja, Myslim Peza, Ndoc Çoba, etc. are not communists. On the other hand we ask the "Balli", "Why, since you are a 'powerful organization', you don't join the Council and intervene to control its operations and prevent the Communist Party from leading you 'towards ruin'?" The "Balli Kombëtar" did not recognize the Peza Conference and the National Liberation General Council. Why did it not recognize them? I think we need to look at the essence of this matter. The "Balli Kombëtar" is made up of various elements who have no clear principles. When they describe themselves as democrats or socialists, they have not the slightest idea of what democracy or socialism is. They have

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3 Mustafa Xhani, during the war member of the National Liberation General Council and of the General Staff of the ANLA, after liberation deputy to the People's Assembly, was treacherously killed by the enemies of the people in March 1947.
no genuine ideals, but have merely formed an alliance. The “Balli” is directed by a central committee, composed of reactionary elements, with a doubtful or sinister past. Those of them who have been emigrants abroad, have fattened themselves on any foreign pasture, taking the money of every country; they have agreed with Giro⁴ and Co. to topple Zog, have based themselves on the Munich Treaty and been supported by the Axis policy. These people are directing the “Balli” as a reactionary force against the national liberation councils. These elements understand that they must play a role in Albania if they are to seize the reins of power with the least possible sacrifice on their part and with all the sacrifice on the part of the people; in this way they hope to shift from one soft seat to another. Although they have been intent on sabotaging the national liberation movement, the National Liberation Council has knocked three or four times at the door of the “Balli Kombëtar”. The “Balli” accepts “cooperation with the Communist Party but not with the ‘National Liberation Council’”. It refuses to recognize the National Liberation Front. We have insisted that the National Liberation Front should include not only the Communist Party and the “Balli”, but also every patriot who is willing to shed his blood for the liberation of the country. We proposed to them that one representative of the National Liberation Council, one of the “Balli”, and one of the Communist Party, should come together to discuss the matter so as to bring about the unification of the people, but they refused. Everyone went on working separately. Then, we suggested at least co-ordination of actions between us, who were already involved in the war, and them, who had not joined in the war and did not wish to do so.

⁴ Giovanni Giro, Italian fascist hierarch, expert in Albanian affairs in the plans of the Italian fascist government to occupy Albania.
Our goal was that we should fight together. If the “Balli” had joined the fight, unity would have arisen out of our common sufferings, and Ali Këcelysra would not have found suitable ground to create complications, even though this co-ordination was the minimum basis for agreement. The “Balli Kombëtar” has fought against the national liberation movement in many ways. It has labelled it communist. They look as though they are waging an ideological war. This was the case not because they failed to understand, but because they wanted to cause a split in the movement and to disrupt the ranks of the National Liberation Front. At that time the armies of the Axis powers had the upper hand, and these people of the “Balli” had not the slightest confidence in the victory of the allies or in the alliance. By refusing to fight against fascism, they in fact rejected the principles of the Atlantic Charter and accepted the slogans of Mustafa Kruja, the war against Greece and Yugoslavia, and compromise with the enemy for defence against the Greek and Yugoslav danger. At the same time, the “Balli Kombëtar” started intriguing with individual people, grossly slandering the communists and misleading the crowd about the national liberation movement; it initiated the compromise with Italy to fight the national liberation movement; The “Balli” people made contact with the government of Mustafa Kruja. They dreamed of taking the government into their own hands, but when they saw that Mustafa Kruja, whose hands were stained with the people’s blood, was thoroughly exposed, although they liked the compromise, they pretended to break with him. But the compromise continued with the advent to power of Maliq Bushati. The “Balli” people were even invited to the palace to give Jacomoni

5 One of the chiefs of the “Balli Kombëtar”, quisling prime minister in 1943.
their opinions on the government of the “Albanian people”, of which the minister and prime minister should make good the damage done by Mustafa Kruja. The “Balli” had brought Bushati to power, and with his advent began a new series of compromises, intrigues and acts of treachery. While patriots were being killed and villages burnt, the “Balli” concluded an agreement with Jacomoni and Dalmazzo. Through the protocol which he signed, Ali Këlcyra ensured the Italian army freedom to pursue the national liberation units. The troops of Dalmazzo burned villages in the Vlora region. The “Balli Kombëtar” thought that in this way they had damaged the national liberation movement, which they considered communist. Ali Këlcyra paid compensation to the peasants for their burned houses (using Italian money), telling them that the villages had been burned by the communists. But who fired the rifles at Gjorm? Hysni Lepenica was against our war, but the people told him: “Either you come and fight, or you are against the people”. This is the epic in which the Ballists take such pride.

These elements do the job of the common spies. We have facts to prove this, documents signed by the commanders of “Balli” units, such as Bektash Cakrani, Qazim Sefo, etc. We have a document signed by them (see the

6 In the battle of Gjorm, a village in the vicinity of Vlora, against the Italian occupiers from the 1st to the 3rd of January 1943, Hysni Lepenica, one of the chief representatives of the “Balli Kombëtar” in the region of Vlora, under pressure of the masses, pretended to unite with the national liberation forces, while in fact he tried to sabotage this battle. The “Balli Kombëtar” claimed credit for the battle of Gjorm so as to deceive the masses, but did not succeed.

7 In February 1943, Bektash Cakrani, representative of the “Balli Kombëtar” in the Mallakastra region, together with the commander of the Italian garrison in Fier, signed an agreement of collusion against the partisan detachments.
In the name of the “Balli Kombëtar” Ali Këlcyra went around inciting the population to take up arms against the partisans and volunteers. Where there were reactionaries, the “Balli Kombëtar” succeeded. Where our forces were well entrenched, he did his best to hinder the struggle, saying: “The time has not come yet; we should preserve our forces. Italy is a great power, and we should not forget the Greeks and Yugoslavs, and the danger they represent”. On the other hand, the “Balli” tried to uphold and preserve the institutions which protected fascism. It was against the efforts to purge the civil and military authorities in the service of the occupiers, for it was conscious of its inability to organize its own state power without them. It worked with might and main to set up the Albanian gendarmerie so as to employ it as a reactionary force against the national liberation movement. On the other hand, it imagined that with the creation of the gendarmerie, the peasants would not dare to move or to join the fight against fascism.

The “Balli” was for an “Albanian army”. When we said that the Albanian army should be created in the mountains, and not in the fascist barracks, the “Balli Kombëtar” distributed leaflets to prevent volunteers from taking to the mountains, claiming that the army should first be created in the barracks, and that it should take to the mountains only when instructed by the “Balli Kombëtar”.

The “Balli” wanted to keep the old laws in force, including the law on tithes, while we opposed this, and the peasants did not give the occupiers a single grain of wheat. When we called on the peasants not to pay any taxes to the occupiers, the “Balli Kombëtar” told them: “Pay, or they will kill us, and burn our villages”.

From day to day the fight of the “Balli Kombëtar” against the national liberation movement assumed differ-
ent forms. The National Liberation Council has shown great patience. All the members of the movement have wanted to show the “Balli” the correct road, in the hope that it would abandon the road of compromise. But the “Balli” pursued a non-commitment policy. Recently, the struggle of the “Balli Kombëtar” against us has been greatly stepped up, from end to end of the country. Its entire work has been directed against us. In Gjirokastra, Dervish Rexhepi and Rasim Babameto have done all they can to impede the movement. In Libohova, they provoked the entry of the Italian army into the region, and turned their rifles against our partisan units. They have sacked Christian villages of the Greek minority to split them from the rest of the nation. But the minority people have given proof of their devotion to the cause of Albania’s freedom. They wanted to extinguish the movement there, but the fighters and the members of the National Liberation Front succeeded in exposing the Ballists at various meetings organized among the people. The people have seen the aims of the “Balli” armed bands, which have been dispersed, while their commanders wander freely about the towns. In Vlora the “Balli Kombëtar” boasts of its “heroic deeds”, but it has committed a thousand infamies there. What, in fact, is this war which the “Balli” is making such a song and dance about? Its members are shouting themselves hoarse about the battle of Gjorm with Hysni Lepenica, the battle of Selenica with Isuf Luzaj, the battle of Mollas with Tefik Cftiri. They claim that it is they who fought these battles against the occupiers, while in reality in Vlora, Korça, Elbasan, and elsewhere, they have not fought except against us. In Gjorm, Hysni Lepenica, as I said before, reluctantly took part in the battle, and we fought together, but it was we who fought the battle of Selenica. The partisan and volunteer units captured 80 carabinieri and a
quantity of weapons. Isuf Luzaj did not fire a single shot. The battle of Mallakastra was not fought by the “Balli”, but by our units from Myzeqe and Vlora. Tefik Cfiri and Skënder Muço have maintained a hostile attitude towards us.

The National Liberation Council called on the “Balli Kombëtar” to take part in the war. The “Balli” did not reply to the Council but to the Communist Party, because it identifies the National Liberation Front with the Communist Party, alleging that the Party hides itself behind the mask of the National Liberation Front. In the leaflet in which it replies to us, the “Balli Kombëtar” adopts the same attitude as the fascist occupier. We have the leaflet here, for you to see, and you can read it for yourselves at the end of the meeting. The “Balli Kombëtar” says that the Communist Party has nothing else to do but to accuse it of compromise. But the Communist Party has done a lot of other things, and people know what it has done. As for the attitude of the “Balli”, the agreement with Dalmazzo is sufficient to prove that it has compromised. “Return to Albanian patriotism”, is their call. And who makes this appeal? Precisely those people who have sold themselves to the occupiers and who deny the patriotism of Qemal Stafa, Vojo Kushi, and their comrades. These people are against the war, and they do the work of the fascist militia. According to them, the partisan units are fighting against the Albanian people, and not against the occupiers. They never mention the national liberation units, but speak only about the Communist Party. These falsifiers of history deny the Albanian people their nation-

8 Member of the CC of the CPA, political secretary of the Communist Youth of Albania, killed while fighting against the occupiers on May 5, 1942, People’s Hero.

9 Member of the CPA, commander of a guerrilla unit, People’s Hero.
al liberation movement. This is an attack on the National Liberation Front, a provocation aimed at unleashing civil war. In Skrapar, we have made an attempt to unite with the “Balli” bands and get them to participate in actions, but in vain. The “Balli” bands turned against us, killed Ramiz Aranitasi¹⁰, the commander, and his murderer remains in their ranks. In Korça, the “Balli” has engaged in propaganda to split our people into Muslims and Christians; while Safet Butka and company have begun to fight openly against us. We have captured documents which prove their treachery¹¹. The men of the “Balli” in Korça go arm in arm with the fascist spies from Yugoslavia and Greece. The documents declare that the national liberation movement is directed against the occupiers, while Safet Butka is against cutting the telephone and telegraph lines, against the attacks on the carabinieri posts, and so on. The Ballists are acting like gangsters in order to raise money.

The “Balli Kombëtar” sends us ultimatums calling on us to abandon the areas under our control, knowing that, when we withdraw from our positions, the occupier moves in and burns the villages, as occurred in Voskop. We are forced to suspect that the “Balli Kombëtar” is collaborating with the fascist invader against us. When we lie in waiting for the troops of the fascist invaders in Voskop, the bands of the “Balli” attack us from the rear. They threaten that, if we launch attacks in their regions, then they will attack us from behind (for example, Pasho

¹⁰ Member of the CPA, commander of a partisan unit, People’s Hero.

¹¹ The document mentioned is a note of the Italian Gendarmerie in Erseka, dated February 3, 1943, addressed to the Royal Questura in Korça which notified that Safet Butka, one of the “Balli Kombëtar” chiefs in the Korça region, was engaged in intense activity to sabotage the National Liberation War.
Kolaneci). And Hasan Velçani and Haki Blloshmi in Mokra make the same threats. Abaz Ermeni writes to Safet Butka: “If we go on like this without action, then the British, who are calling for action, will support the other side. Attack the enemy, (he says), regardless of what the Tirana Central Committee says in its order of 29.6.43.”

These are only a few documents. We have others; every region has hundreds. We can see the naked reality of the work of the “Balli”. We see that they are involved in betrayal. We must open the eyes of the people duped by the “Balli” and bring them on to the right road.

The aim of the National Liberation Council is to create solid unity, unity for the war, and not to hinder it. With this aim in mind it decided to send a delegation to the “Balli Kombëtar” in order to find out clearly what its attitude is, and to see whether it was seriously seeking to unite. The Council appointed as members of the delegation: Abaz Kupi, Ymer Dishnica, Mustafa Gjinishi, etc., and told them the principal points on which unity should be based. These were: the “Balli Kombëtar” must enter the war against the occupiers; the “Balli” must end its fight against the national liberation movement and the Communist Party; through struggle and work, to get the “Balli” to take part in a broad conference to lay on the table and discuss many problems concerning unity. This delegation made contact with the “Balli Kombëtar”. Among you some may have attended the meeting at Zalli Herrit and Mukje. Our comrades there did not know how to defend the line of the National Liberation Front, but fell right into the lap of the “Balli Kombëtar” which knew how to impose its aims. It is clear (see the leaflet) that this was a defeat for the National Liberation Council. Why did our comrades go to that meeting? They went to bring the “Balli” into the war, and to hinder its war
against the national liberation movement and the Communist Party. But in fact what they talked about there was “independent Albania” and “ethnic Albania”, and the war of today was forgotten.

On July 26, 1943, the first minutes were endorsed. The “Balli” wanted, through some token attacks, to shift from one soft seat to another, profiting from the fight others are waging. It thought that the day had come for it to ascend the throne. When the Duce fell, the “Balli” believed that it was all over, just as Mussolini had thought when France fell. The “Balli Kombëtar” trumpeted to its members to take to the mountains.

The “Balli” tried to impose its own opinions on us. And instead of talking about fighting the bloody war against the occupiers, they talked about setting up a committee. They started at the wrong end. The “Committee for the Salvation of Albania” was set up. This was the first error of our comrades, when they sat at the table with those people who have fought so hard against us, and have categorized us as people without a homeland.

There was talk of immediate fighting. But the “Balli” always talks, and does nothing else but talk about fighting. The “Balli” members themselves call Ali Këlcyra a traitor and, at the same time, regard him as the most patriotic democrat.

They speak of complete independence for Albania. This was also discussed at length at Mukje. The aim is to blot out April 12, 1939, and hastily proclaim “independence”. But it is the Albanian people who will proclaim independence, and not the “Balli”, which has been collaborating with fascism. The “Balli” wanted to blot out April 12, 1939, because three quarters of the Ballists had recognized the Accord of the Crown, while we had never recognized it. The people have never recognized either the fascist occupation or Victor Emmanuel.
The question of independence was discussed at length, as was the question of Kosova. This question has also served Mustafa Kruja as a bone of contention, as a matter for quarrels and division.

The National Liberation Council has had a clear-line and policy concerning Kosova and Çamëria, and stands by this policy, because it is correct. Our national liberation war is a people's war, a common struggle side by side with the allies against the Axis. This sound alliance tested in battle is more valuable than charters. The aim is that together, united, we should press on with the war, forgetting all the past, because over our heads hangs the threat of the common enemy; later on, we who have fought together in the greatest friendship will clear up our disagreements. The Albanian people, who know what suffering is, would never wish to enslave and dismember other nations who have suffered as they have, and vice-versa. This war has brought the peoples together. We have the protection of the Soviet Union, the defender of the small states and of all peoples. The question of Kosova cannot be ignored. The population there will agree among themselves and decide which way to go. The national liberation movement has a duty to make the Kosova population conscious of their aspirations, telling them that they must save themselves by struggle from the fascist occupiers, or some possible Yugoslav occupier such as Mihailovich. We should enable the population of Kosova to make their own decision about which way to go, as we want to do ourselves, and fight against the Yugoslavia which would try to enslave it.

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12 In 1942 minister of war in the puppet Yugoslav government in London. He collaborated with the German occupiers against the Yugoslav national liberation movement, and terrorized the population of Kosova.
Our comrades acted wrongly at that meeting. We tell our opinion frankly. These comrades behaved like opportunists. In the second minutes, the “Balli Kombëtar” managed to change several of our clauses: “Immediate war against the enemy occupiers and against all other possible occupiers.” Our delegates discussed this, but they did not know how to defend their views and ended by signing the minutes. Another point was added: “Ethnic Albania”. In this way they accepted the thesis of the “Balli Kombëtar”, which is not waging a national liberation war, but a war against us, and thus our delegation negated our struggle, our program, and the decisions of the Peza Conference. On the third point the word “popular” was added, for it was only “democratic”. The fourth point speaks about a “provisional government”, which means: the feverish desire of the “Balli Kombëtar” to become the government. A decision was reached to set up a “provisional committee”, then a “permanent committee” which would “decide on the liberation of Albania”.

These are the minutes signed by the delegation of the National Liberation Council. We see that our comrades were mistaken, that they slipped into opportunism, that they were unable to stand by the directives they had received from the Council. A proclamation was published, which crowns their work (the leaflet is read). In the leaflet we see that the national liberation movement has been swept aside. Only the “Balli Kombëtar”, which did not fire a single shot, and a “Committee” which leads the

33 With the words “against all other possible occupiers” the “Balli Kombëtar” meant to turn the attention of the people away from the war against the Italian fascist occupiers, with which it was colluding, by qualifying “the Serbian and Greek occupiers” as the most dangerous enemies of Albania. This was opposite to the instructions the National Liberation General Council had given to its delegation. (See in this volume p. 161).
war emerge from it. They promote the “Balli” which has fought against us so long, and do not even mention the national liberation movement. There is not a single word about fascism or about the atrocities of the Italians. We should be patient no longer. We cannot allow our movement, our sacrifices, and our national liberation councils to be swept aside, as happened in Mukjë.

Our delegation is greatly to be blamed here. The National Liberation General Council does not agree with them, and even the delegates themselves understood that they had committed a grave error. The “Balli Kombëtar” managed to impose on them its intrigues and its burning desires. How should we act towards the “Balli Kombëtar”? As I have said, the movement demands that all who want progress should unite in the struggle. We seek a strong and healthy unity, and this can be achieved only in the fight. We shall unite with the “Balli Kombëtar” only when it gets down to business, fighting the enemy and shedding its blood, when it no longer has in its ranks sold-out opportunistic elements, bandits and criminals, when its ranks are cleaned up (Ali Këlcyra, Safet Butka, Tefik Çiri and others should be purged). Individuals like these, we shall expose before the people as perpetrators of fratricide, because it is they who threaten us with letters and leaflets, who pour out abuse against us and fight us with arms. We shall cooperate with the “Balli Kombëtar” when the honest elements in its ranks understand where the chiefs of the “Balli Kombëtar” have been driven by their own ideas, because among the Ballists there are people who are not as bad as their chiefs. Only when the “Balli” has given clear proof of its good intentions, can we unite with it. But the “Balli Kombëtar” is becoming a “refugium peccatorum”, a refuge for assassins and reactionaries. Irfan Ohri and his agents are being incorporated in it, and all those who were on the side of the
fascists, like Shëfket Vërlaci and his cronies. They want to extinguish the movement and reimpose the forces of darkness so that tomorrow the people will not have the chance to judge them for their treason. The "Balli Kombëtar" is following a completely wrong road, and does not want the Albanian people to find it out. We shall never allow the reactionary elements of the "Balli Kombëtar" to come in and destroy our councils in the places where our comrades have been killed to set them up. We shall punish them with the greatest severity. Now the people have understood who we are and what we want, and they will support us and rally around us. We shall also reply to the "Balli Kombëtar" about the "Committee" which has been created, and about the accusations against us, but we must organize the councils, strengthen the army, make the people conscious, and wage a fierce war against all traitors. This Council\textsuperscript{14} has not accepted the "Committee", and I hope this conference will not accept it either. We should unite with the honest elements, and not with worthless people.

As you can see, the National Liberation Front and the CPA, which leads it, have done their best, showing great patience; they have tried in every way and made sacrifices to persuade the "Balli Kombëtar" to join the war against the occupiers for the liberation of our people. But the "Balli Kombëtar" joined in the war against the people, against the Front, against the CPA; the "Balli Kombëtar", or the "Balli Tradhëtar"\textsuperscript{*}, has united with the occupiers. Thus they have burned their bridges. We will fight them mercilessly, as the traitors and collaborators with the occupiers that they are.

\textsuperscript{14} The National Liberation General Council.

\textsuperscript{*} Balli Kombëtar = National Front; Balli Tradhëtar = Traitorous Front.
We have fought and defeated Italian fascism, Mustafa Kruja and the militia. We are fighting and will defeat the “Balli Kombëtar”, too, if the misguided elements do not repent and do not take the correct road. I ask each of you to express your opinion, but I do not think that the main point is the question of the “Balli”. The main issue is the war against the occupiers. The problem of the “Balli” comes next.

We shall try to bring other trends into the national liberation movement. This is how we acted, for example, with the Greek minority. Today they are under occupation by the same enemy. They have had to fight side by side with us, their war is our war, for the same enemy is oppressing us. The people of Dropull have understood this well. The Greek minority has risen to the occasion, fought with dedication, and defended the interests of the homeland against the Greek reactionaries.

There are also the Dibra chieftains: comrade Haxhi Lleshi and others will speak about them, but I, too, have something to say about them. They have collaborated openly with the occupiers, and are continuing to do so. We have not failed to expose them before the people, so that they renounce the agreement signed with the occupier to the detriment of our movement, the war of partisan units and action. We have told them individually and before the people to participate in the councils, and to set up councils. They imagined that they could avoid war through compromises, and in the end obtain sinecures; but they did not understand that fascism is perfidious (take the example of Qazim Koculi). Fascism has attacked them one by one, or has reached a compromise with some. How should we behave towards the elements who

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45 After the defeat suffered by Italian and Albanian fascists in Gjorn, Qazim Koculi was shot by the fascists themselves.
have not totally compromised themselves? We should unite with them and with others who are not on the side of the occupiers. As for those who have killed and burned, we shall settle accounts with them with guns.

As for the Catholic clergy of Shkodra and the mountain regions, we shall try to turn them from the road of war against the national liberation movement, and if this is not possible, then we shall fight them relentlessly.

We should try to detach from the traitors the misguided people from the poor strata of the population, those who go to bed hungry at night. If we try hard enough we can achieve this.

There are many, many isolated patriots and nationalists who have not taken part in the war. These are people of various mentalities. They fought the First World War in a different manner. They are afraid for themselves and they fear us. We should extend a hand to them, rally them, explain things to them, and ask them to help our struggle, no matter how small their aid may be. We should gather them around the national liberation councils.

In our activity we should always uphold the principles laid down at the Peza Conference. We should explain to the people our work and the way we are going so that they do not come to us blindly, but understand these principles clearly. We must go to the people in this way so that the power of the national liberation councils becomes the only power, because it is the only democratic one. Thus, we will achieve a democratic state power, for which we are ready to give what is most precious to us, our lives.

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DIRECTIVE ON THE SITUATION CREATED FOLLOWING THE CAPITULATION OF FASCIST ITALY

September 10, 1943

TO ALL REGIONAL PARTY COMMITTEES

Dear comrades,

You are no doubt aware of the situation created, but nevertheless we are informing you about the state of affairs, the attitude you should adopt, and measures to be taken, especially concerning the internal situation.

The great Soviet offensive, carried out with new breadth and style and extending over a front of more than one thousand kilometers, is advancing, liberating towns and wide areas. This powerful offensive has not only stopped the Germans, but has forced them to retreat with countless losses. The words of comrade Stalin are coming true — he said: "We shall liberate our lands from the German fascist invaders within a short time, and they will suffer the most shameful defeat". Cities such as Kharkov, Byelgorod, Orel, Stalino and the entire Donets basin are permanently in the hands of the heroic Red Army. The Soviet armed forces, which are growing in numbers and becoming stronger all the time, armed with the most up-to-date equipment, are marching towards the Ukraine in tenfold forces. In face of the tanks, aircraft, and the brilliant strategy of our great comrade Stalin, Hitler's
gang and the supposedly invincible German strategy suffered ignominious defeat, and the glorious Red Army, led by the Bolshevik Party of the USSR, is preparing the speedy liberation of the enslaved peoples, and a happy future for them.

Italy has surrendered unconditionally. The continuing political and military defeats suffered by fascism in Africa, Sicily and elsewhere brought about the ignominious downfall of Mussolini and the advent of the reactionary government of Badoglio. One of the main causes which constrained the Badoglio government to capitulate was the development of the Italian people's movement, the magnificent strikes of the workers (proletariat) of the North led by the heroic Italian Communist Party and other progressive parties. (We note that the BBC, characteristically, makes no reference to the Italian Communist Party, but only to the Italian Socialist Party, as the leader of this movement; it does the same with the Polish Socialist Party and other social democratic, "progress-loving", "agrarian", etc. parties, as a means of infection from abroad to bring about the creation of parties of this type in other countries too, with the aim of dividing the people's forces in their liberation struggle and diverting them from the objective of their war. The aim is to prevent the fall of Hitler and Mussolini from having serious consequences for the reactionaries and the capitalists of London and New York, to disorganize the proletariat, in the first place, and the people's forces, and to arouse scepticism among the backward masses. This is how they acted in the First World War with the social democratic and social-chauvinist parties led by Kautsky, Scheidemann, Tseretelli, Chernov, Legien, and Co. But the communist parties have the

1 The Badoglio government came to power in July 1943, and fell in June 1944.
experience of the First World War, and will know how to find their bearings in this situation.)

The alliance between the British and American people on one hand, and the people of the Soviet Union on the other, is a reality, a close alliance in the war against fascism. This is a special and characteristic phase of this war, and the alliance is being strengthened between the peoples of Britain, America and the Soviet Union, and those of the enslaved nations.

Hitler wanted to capture all the countries of the world, and thus threatened the national existence of Britain and America. This is one of the main reasons for the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance. But we should not forget that British government officials rejected the request for this alliance made by the Soviet Union a long time ago, until British interests were directly threatened by German imperialism, which became a real danger to Britain. It is natural that in such a situation a strong bloc was created by this alliance, which is headed by the Soviet Union. More and more anti-fascist forces began to gather round this bloc.

In the highest circles in Britain and in the British government itself, there are reactionary elements who want to establish reactionary forces in the oppressed countries, and this is precisely why they have been trying to form reactionary governments in London to take over in the oppressed countries after the fall of Hitler. The same circles which installed Hitler and Mussolini in power, are now trying to turn the course of the present war against Hitler and Mussolini in the direction of a so-called new Europe, that is, in the direction of a new Versailles². Thus they

²The great imperialist powers, the signers of the Versailles Treaty (July 1919), trampling underfoot the rights of the Albanian people, left out of the border large Albanian inhabited territories to satisfy the greed of the chauvinists of the border states, servants of the imperialist powers.
have set up reactionary governments to represent those peoples; but in fact they are nothing but tools in the hands of reaction to oppress the national liberation movements of those peoples. We cannot exclude the possibility of such government for Albania being set up in London, or of aid to create one here; therefore we are informing the comrades so that, if this happens, they will know what attitude to take. Certain individuals in government circles and some prominent journalists, such as Beveridge, the "sociologist" of the "new Europe", have promised the revival of a "new Europe" and aid in food, clothing, medicines, etc. We are opposed to the way they give this aid and to the purpose for which it is given. The comrades should be clear about this question and should study it carefully, so that they direct their agitation, not against Britain and America in general, for we are in an alliance with them in this war, but against the reactionary elements in the governments of those countries.

Following the unconditional surrender of Italy a new situation has been created, not only in Italy, but here too. The Germans are endeavouring to concentrate all power in their hands, and thus to occupy "occupied" Albania. In this situation there are contradictions between the German and Italian soldiers. Meanwhile our stand towards the Italian army is changing, and today we regard it with a different eye. We should exploit their contradictions, which are becoming more profound from day to day. If the Italian army is not going to fight against us, we shall invite it to join us under the slogan "fraternization in the war against Hitler's Germany" and we shall consider the

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3 Reactionary British economist, ardent defender of the capitalist order.
Italian soldiers as brothers-in-arms; but if they go on fighting against us, then we shall fight them as fiercely as the Germans.

The differentiation of the reaction began some time ago, and this process is now becoming more and more marked, and not to our advantage, but with reaction gaining strength. It is clear that day by day, further reactionary elements are gathering around the “Balli”. These reactionary and “Ballist” elements are endeavouring to seize power and establish their reactionary government. They are trying to increase their strength, and thus to profit from a possible allied landing.

The landing of the allies in the Balkans, or even in Albania, is no longer a remote prospect. Therefore our organizations should work to be able to cope with such a situation. If there should be an allied landing, the national liberation councils will have to be genuine organs of the

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4 The call of the General Staff of the ANLA to surrender the arms and to join the ANLA in the war against the Hitlerites was answered by only 15,000 Italian officers and men of whom 1,500 were incorporated into the Albanian partisan units, while the others were sheltered in the liberated areas of the country. According to the orders of the CPA, the people welcomed them and supported them fraternity, despite the atrocities the Italian fascist army had perpetrated in Albania, while the chief persons responsible for these crimes were meted out the punishment they deserved wherever they were got hold of. The greater part of the Italian army stationed in Albania surrendered to the Germans and was interned to forced labour camps in Germany, where many officers and men were cruelly massacred.

5 At that time it was rumoured that the allied forces would soon land in the Balkans. The Anglo-American forces did not land in the Balkans either in 1943 or at the beginning of 1944. In summer and autumn when the Allied Mediterranean High Command asked to land its troops in Albania with the specific aim of saving the internal reaction from complete destruction and impeding the triumph of the people’s revolution, the General Staff of the ANLA refused permission for such a landing.
people's power. They will have to mobilize the entire people around them and prevent the other forces, such as the “Balli Kombëtar”, from exerting their influence on the people. The National Liberation Army must be very strong, must have the whole people behind it, and not permit the creation of military formations of its opponents, such as the “Balli Kombëtar”. You should be aware that the allied landing forces will support all the Albanian forces they meet, without any preference for those of the national liberation movement, and moreover, bearing in mind the Darlan affair, with preference for the reactionaries. To avoid this possibility, from now on the national liberation forces should begin to make their presence felt everywhere and, in the case of a landing, should present themselves to the allies, through the councils and the National Liberation Army, as the sole state power of the Albanian people. The allies should be in Albania with their armies only to smash the Germans and their running dogs, but the governing of Albania should be entirely in the hands of the national liberation movement, and the allies should recognize this. Therefore, as from today, all the organizations should work with all their might to this end.

You know that the agreement concluded with the “Balli Kombëtar” on the creation of the “Committee for the Salvation of Albania” was to the detriment of the national liberation movement and our Party, and as such has been repudiated by the Central Committee. We informed you of this long ago. This agreement has put us in a difficult position. At a time when the “Balli

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6 Reactionary French admiral, former commander of the armed forces of the Vichy fascist government. In November 1942 he handed himself over to the Americans in North Africa, who, furthering their imperialist aims, appointed him as Commissioner for French North Africa.
Kombëtar" should have been in a tight corner because of its activity in favour of the fascist occupiers, at a time when the "Balli" should have been shown up before the Albanian people as a disruptive organization, systematically sabotaging all our efforts to unite our people on a sound basis, we played right into its hands, with just the agreement it wanted to help it scheme and plot among the people. It was the moment to accelerate the differentiation in the ranks of the "Balli", in order to separate the people from the "Balli", to divide the honest elements, who had been victims of the reactionary leaders, from the opportunist, anti-popular, and anti-patriotic policy of the "Balli". Through this agreement we enabled the "Balli" to become more closely linked with the elements who had brought pressure to bear from within to persuade it to reach an agreement with us. We allowed the "Balli" to tighten and strengthen its ranks and retain a strong hold over the backward masses who, deceived and lacking political clarity, still follow it. The reaction and the "Balli" leaders especially, now hope to divide the ranks of the National Liberation War, to consolidate their position through political manoeuvres; they are thinking of forming a social-democratic party for this purpose. At the head of this manoeuvre they have placed such elements as Skënder Muço and Hysni Lepenica, who, though reactionaries in deeds, are unfortunately regarded as democrats by a section of the people. We should be careful to prevent that section of the national liberation movement, which is still unclear about unity and about how unity with the "Balli" should be effected, from falling into the trap of this manoeuvre. We should be cautious about elements who have entered the ranks of the Party after insufficient work has been done with them, and who have had close links with elements who oppose the National Liberation War,
and we should also be careful about the elements from the former "Zjarri" group.

In order to clarify the situation, to take a definite stand in the situation which had arisen it was necessary to convene the National Liberation General Council and the 2nd National Liberation Conference on a national scale. Because of the haste and because of the conditions in which we find ourselves, it was not possible for a very large number of delegates to attend. At the Conference, a unanimity of opinion was evident, especially concerning the stand we should maintain towards the "Balli Kombëtar". Although we shall shortly send you the resolution of the Conference, we are giving here a summary of the main points of its decisions:

"The 'Balli Kombëtar' is an organization which emerged as a reaction against the national liberation movement; it has fallen into the trap prepared by the enemy to divide the Albanian people and to bring about a fratricidal war. The whole of reaction, with all its various shades, is being incorporated into its ranks.

Our stand towards the 'Balli' should be severe and correct. Its opportunist policy should be denounced without mercy, its demagogical campaign for unity should be combatted, and it should be clearly explained that it is the national liberation movement alone that has striven with might and main for the true unity of the Albanian people; that unity is of the greatest importance to those who support the war and freedom of the people; that unity cannot be achieved when one takes one road and the other takes the opposite one, that unity must be based on a sound foundation, otherwise it is not unity, but division. We call on the 'Balli Kombëtar' to renounce its incorrect policy and join the ranks of the National
The majority of the Dibra chieftains, many Northern chieftains, and many influential figures in South

7 Chieftains in some mountain areas where traces of the tribal system were still preserved.
and Central Albania have remained in a position close to that of the 'Balli'. The Dibra chieftains have struck up an 'itifak' among themselves and made an agreement with the enemy, which is the equivalent of the Dalmazzo-Këlcyra protocol. On the question of unity and cooperation with them and with all those outside the national liberation movement, the same stand should be maintained as towards the 'Balli Kombëtar'.

With regard to the capitulation of Italy, the Conference has decided that we should call on the Italians to surrender to us, for we are one of the powers of the British-Soviet-American alliance. If they persist in their previous stand towards us, we, too, shall persist in our previous stand, and shall be even more severe. But we should bear in mind that today our chief enemy is Germany and that the Italian soldiers want to go home more than anything else, so we should call on them to join us against the Germans, or give us their weapons. We should insist on disarming the Italian army. In the new situation, especially in the liberated zones, the national-liberation councils should truly exercise state power and eliminate the influence of other trends. To this end, the national liberation councils should be strengthened, especially from the organizational viewpoint, and councils should be set up in every village, in communes, sub-prefectures (not for the towns, but for the entire sub-prefecture) and prefectures."

We think that it will be impossible to reach an agreement with the "Balli Kombëtar". We think, too, that the "Balli" has embarked on a road which will inevitably lead to an armed clash with us, and therefore we should work

* Itifak (Tur. in the original) — alliance.
as follows: through intelligent and tireless work we should unmask the "Balli" and discredit it in the eyes of the people, detach the people from it and bring them over to our side; we should cause divergencies in the ranks of the "Balli", and create situations which will encourage and accelerate the differentiation in the ranks of the "Balli", and strike with intelligence and determination at its reactionary leaders; we should present the "Balli" to the people as the source of splits and fratricide, so that they see that the policy of the "Balli" will lead to armed confrontation; we should encourage the entire people to revolt against this, and thus the historic responsibility for this lack of unity among the Albanian people, and for the armed clashes among them, will fall where it belongs, and this should be made clear to everyone in Albania. We must prepare ourselves, we must prepare the whole national liberation movement, and the people for an armed clash with the "Balli". The "Balli" is preparing this clash and must not catch us with our arms folded. We must not allow the "Balli" to prepare itself and choose the conditions most favourable to its attack on us, but should force it into a corner and make it show its hand, and thus we can attack it at the moment most favourable to us, when the people have understood what it is up to, and have united with us against it.

The situation forces us to act, but in order to act we must be prepared, especially, militarily. The organization and strengthening of the military units in the towns is today an urgent problem of great importance. These units should be well equipped with revolvers and hand-grenades and, if possible, with automatic rifles (we should do our best to buy or seize these weapons from the Italians, and not wait a single day for others to send them to us). The units should be placed under the command of the best, most capable and suitable comrades of the Party. We
should study how to attack the most important town centres and, especially, those centres where arms are stored. The Gestapo centers and those of the German commands in general should be discovered and attacked. The most dangerous spies, the agents of the fifth column, people who until yesterday were closely linked with the enemy, and today are going underground or joining other organizations, such as the "Balli Kombëtar", in order to organize the war against the national liberation movement, and especially against our Party, such people as Irfan Ohri, Qamil Xhani, Vehib Runa, etc., must be executed. The spies and agents of the German army must be executed. In the towns, hiding places must be prepared for caches of weapons and for underground activists, in order to ensure the continuous functioning of our organizations and units.

Always bear in mind that in attacks on towns the actions of the guerrilla units inside the town should be combined with those of the partisan units. Never forget the importance of documents in the secret offices of the enemy which should fall into our hands. As from now all party organizations should be mobilized to deal with anything that might occur and be ready to cope with the unexpected. The party cells will be the driving force to bring the entire people of town and countryside into motion, and should be purged of any elements who will not carry out these vital tasks. The Party comrades should be told that now the time has come for them to really prove themselves as the reliable and courageous leading section of the people, and to understand the decisiveness of this moment we are passing through towards taking state power. The cells should be the driving force of the groups of sympathizers and friends of the Party, to whom it should be stressed that today they should give their all for the liberation of the country, to consolidate our Party and
raise its prestige. The Party's technical equipment should be fully mobilized and working day and night, producing leaflets and proclamations to explain to the people the different situations created and the events which are unfolding, always indicating the road they should follow. At every moment you should maintain a clear-cut political stand, based on the directives of the Central Committee. The mobilization of the whole organization should be linked with the mobilization and preparation of the entire people for the general uprising. Great care should be devoted to the mobilization and organization of the youth, because the young people in Albania are the most vigorous and healthiest force of the national liberation movement. The greatest possible help should be given to the youth.

Anti-fascist women's organizations should be set up, and they do not have to be brought together only on the basis of their suburb or village; they can and should be set up also on the basis of occupation, or say, for example, through setting up societies to abolish illiteracy, through sewing circles to make clothing for the army, etc. These organizations should be given all possible aid, and we should draw elements from them into the Party.

Following the capitulation of Italy, we should anticipate the German resistance on the continent and here in Albania. The Germans are reinforcing parts of our coasts to defend themselves from an allied landing. On the other hand, the German fascists will try to attack us; they will also try to hitch internal reaction to their chariot. The "Balli Kombëtar" has not so far spoken out against nazism, and already the desire for collaboration with the Germans is being expressed in "Ballist" circles. However, the reaction will make another attempt, if not openly (because Germany is heading for its doom), at least indirectly, to beg the Germans to help strengthen its already shaken position. Therefore, you will have to judge the situation
with great cool-headedness, always at the head of the people and in command of the situation.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee of the Party

Shpati

DEATH TO FASCISM — FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLE!

P.S. — These directives, without necessarily being read, should be explained in all the party cells, and on the basis of them instructions should be issued to all party organizations, down to the groups of sympathizers. In particular, they should be explained in all the cells of the units and battalions of your region.

First published in “Principal Documents of the PLA”, vol. 1, Tirana 1960.
LETTER TO COMRADE HAXHI LLESHEI ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY POWER IN KRUJA AND DIBRA AND ON THE STAND TO BE MAINTAINED TOWARDS THE MACEDONIAN MINORITY

September 24, 1943

Dear Comrade Haxhi,

We have received your letter and congratulate you on your success in liberating Kruja. As for the organization of the civil power in the city, we have instructed Dr. Nishani to go to Kruja, and a council is to be set up on the basis laid down in the Constitution. Bazi i Canës will certainly have come by now, and we are interested to know his attitude. If he is there, discuss the decision of the Conference with him, and if he agrees, proceed together with him to hold the elections for the council in the most democratic manner, through conferences and meetings of the people. This should not be done according to the wishes of Bazi i Canës, but according to the wishes of the people, who will choose whom they want, in conformity with the Constitution. If Bazi i Canës does not maintain

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1 The Constitution of the national liberation councils approved at the 2nd National Liberation Conference in Labinot.

2 This refers to the decisions of the 2nd National Liberation Conference which Abaz Kupi did not attend.
a good attitude, the comrades should go on with their work and establish the state power. Tell the responsible comrades that they should not fail to organize daily conferences among the people, and with the youth and women. The people should understand that the day has come for them to express their own will, and to decide for themselves, and not the feudal chieftains.

On the question of your departure for Dibra, we agree with you that you should depart immediately, for your presence there is essential. You will certainly find many difficulties there, but we are sure that through organized and careful work, relying on the sympathy of the masses for our movement, you will achieve concrete results. You are better informed on the question of the chieftains than we are. You know about their efforts to take power, as well as the method they are using. In this situation, we should do everything possible to surmount the chaos, dominate the situation, and direct the work for the establishment of our own state power. To do this, we should attach great importance to setting up the councils. They should take full power into their hands, and should be assisted in fulfilling this task by all those former state officials who have not soiled their hands by involvement in the affairs of the occupiers. Our state power must prove to the people that we can govern with the greatest justice. For this reason, for every section of work honest and resolute people should be appointed to the council. No other state power can exist alongside ours; there cannot be dual power. And if any clique, such as the "Balli Kombëtar", attempts to recreate the old form of government, you must sabotage it by every means, denouncing it to the people as a form of government which will restore their old sufferings and misery. You should
immediately set up local and regional commands\(^3\) with honest elements from the towns or villages, and the former police force should no longer patrol the streets to maintain order. This task should be carried out by volunteers, who should be organized into different sections: maintenance of order, traffic control, prevention of theft and speculation, ensuring of food supplies for the people, etc. These volunteers should act under the orders of the regional command which is subordinate to your military command. Comrade Haxhi, you should take the question of the commands and the setting up of the state power with the utmost seriousness, for our ultimate success depends on the first steps we take. Always try to reach agreement with those of the chieftains who appear somewhat sympathetic to this state power, and lose no opportunity to exploit the antagonism among them to the advantage of our cause.

The question of the Macedonian minority.—We have received a letter from Tempo\(^4\) and from the person responsible for Macedonian affairs in Dibra, in which they speak of the situation in this zone and of the work which should be carried out there.

This is how you should act, and you should transmit these instructions to the other leading comrades there: the question of the border should not be mentioned at all for

\(^3\) The partisan military administration in the rear was organized since the second semester of 1943. The local and regional commands were the organs of this administration, which fulfilled the tasks of the people's police in the liberated areas, as sound supporters and auxiliaries to the national liberation councils and the partisan units.

\(^4\) Vukmanovich Tempo, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY. During the war he maintained a markedly chauvinist stand towards Albania and the CPA.
the time being, nor should you discuss whether Dibra should be Yugoslav or Albanian. We know that this is a knotty question which will be settled later on; on the other hand, we are against the division made by the fascists and support the self-determination of the peoples. As for Dibra, we know that this town has a Macedonian minority and it is situated on the old Yugoslav border. In the present situation, while the enemy are still in the Balkans, while all Kosovo and Macedonia are under the heel of the most savage reaction, while in the Dibra region the leaders of the reaction are active and strong, if not stronger than us, it is impossible and impermissible to implement our correct line concerning the question of the border, for if we act according to the advice of Tempo and leave Dibra, not only will the Macedonians be unable to control the situation, but the reaction will strike heavily at them and us together, and will fight all the more ruthlessly against us. Tempo’s proposal does not seem to us to be a good solution. We should set up our national liberation power there, grant the Macedonians the rights of a minority, make efforts to have them participate in the national liberation councils, too, and thus try to convince the population and gain their confidence. When our positions are consolidated, as well as those of the Yugoslavs, in Kosovo, Metohia, and Macedonia, when we are stronger than the reaction, then it goes without saying that we shall apply the principle for which we are fighting. We believe that we are not in error if we act in this manner, in the present situation. We have written to Tempo along these lines, but you, too, should try to make contact with him, or with the responsible representative of the Yugoslav Party in Dibra, and explain our standpoint. Let us know how this matter develops; we advise you to act with the greatest circumspection and in a spirit of complete fraternity.
Lose no opportunity to consolidate the position of our Party, organize conferences continually, have the cells meet regularly, and see that decisions are taken and carried out. For this purpose, we must ensure the division made by the Fascists and support the self-determination of the peoples. We must work for a Macedonian minority in the Balkans, and present ourselves as the new face of the people's movement, prepared to lead the revolution. We must strengthen the ties and bonds between the different peoples, and the people of the Diaspora. We must work towards a new phase of international revolution and cooperation.

Best regards,

For the Central Committee of the CPA

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 1.
LETTER TO THE BERAT REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA, CRITICIZING ITS OPPORTUNIST STAND TOWARDS THE "BALLI KOMBËTAR" AND GIVING INSTRUCTIONS ON STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCILS

September 26, 1943

Dear comrades,

We received your letter of 22. 9. 1943. Your failure to keep the Central Committee informed about your affairs has become a chronic illness which has gone on for over a year. This is no way to work, to leave us in the dark for two or three months without any news, run into trouble, and then to send us a letter saying, "we are ready to accept condemnation for the mistake we have made". In our view, such words do not help our work run smoothly. There is no point in repeating that things cannot go on like this. We assure you that this is the last time we will tolerate such a state of affairs; if it happens again, we will take measures which will do you no credit as communists and leaders.

We have sent you two circulars¹, one for the vice-commisars of the partisan detachments, and the other for

¹These circulars deal: the first with the strengthening of the party organizations in the National Liberation Army, and the second with the establishment of the national liberation councils throughout the country.
the national liberation councils. These circulars should not be duplicated wholesale, but only in a limited number: enough for the vice-commissars and the national liberation councils. Of course, comrades should go to explain these circulars (after having studied them themselves) to a group of activists made up of vice-commissars and commissars of detachments. The same should be done in the national liberation councils by the comrades who participate in them or help in their activity.

We note with concern that in an eight-page report from the leading comrades in charge of the work in the entire Berat region, a report addressed to the Central Committee of the Party, there is not a single line about the organizational situation of the Party. The one thing we know, and not in any detail, is that the reaction has done great harm in the ranks of our comrades. And even this is hearsay, without official confirmation. Does the party organization exist there or not? Is there a leading committee? We cannot answer those questions, because what is happening in Berat is a profound mystery to us. In such a situation, the Central Committee does not know how to help your region, or how to guide your organization. If you take the work of the Party so lightly and consider it unnecessary to keep the Central Committee informed, then that is another matter. This is an error that has been recurring for a year and a half, and not an accidental mistake. This method of work will cause us great harm, and it will place us in a difficult situation. We do not know how things are with the youth, or the state of its organization. Perhaps the youth organization compiles its own reports and sends them to its Central Committee, but you should not forget that this is a sector of the Party, and you should take the greatest care to report to us on its work. On the question of the Party, once again, and for the last time, we repeat that we expect a clear report.
on the situation, on the activities in progress, the number of cells and groups of sympathizers, the number of party members, and their names according to their distribution in the different cells. Beside their names, the leading comrades of the regional party committee should give their opinions about the comrades. At the same time, you should not forget to note their occupations. This must be done in the shortest possible time. Within five days we should have a full picture of your organization. We want this every month, as well as notes on any additional activities, cells or new party members. We have asked you many times to do this, but have never received an answer. We cannot repeat this in every letter. If you tell us that there is no one able to do this, we reply simply that these reports are essential to the Central Committee, and these directives must be implemented by every regional committee. Those who do not comply with them are disobeying the Central Committee.

When we have received such a report, we will try to help you as much as we are able, but otherwise we cannot, because, at present, it is impossible to give you instructions for the situations that arise in your region. General instructions will not be enough, for we have always issued such instructions, but it is evident that in practice, in the majority of cases, they have not been implemented, as, for instance, in your region. In your town there are two administrations: one is that of the “Balli”, and the other is ours. This is a thing which should not have happened. We cannot tolerate a state of affairs where the “Balli Kombëtar” sets up its administration alongside ours. We cannot allow any dualism in this matter. Therefore you must oppose their power, and only ours must be recognized. You must fight it by every means: through propaganda and meetings, speaking openly in broad conferences about what the “Balli Kombëtar” and its adherents are.
You must expose the "Balli Kombëtar" and its supporters, from Abaz Ermeni to Fazlil Frashëri. There can be no unity with the "Balli Kombëtar". For those who have understood what the "Balli Kombëtar" is, let them come into our ranks, and publicly disown their adherence to the "Balli Kombëtar" and the mistake they have made. Comrades, the establishment of state power is no laughing matter, and if we do not know how to act correctly right from start, we may be sure that we will meet grave obstacles later. Now the councils should no longer be elected according to the criteria followed so far, for in many cases they have been lifeless and formal. Now the councils are the highest form of state power and have many functions. The present councils in the liberated zones, and above all in the towns, not only collect aid, but govern and direct every aspect of the life of the city and region amid all the complications arising in the course of life and the war. Therefore, their election should proceed according to the Rules and Constitution of the councils, which you no doubt possess. These councils should be elected by all the people and should be divided into different sections, such as education, public works, finance, health, etc.; one councillor should be put in charge of each section, a determined and experienced person whose loyalty has been tested in the war. In his section, he may also be assisted by officials of the former regime. Each should have his own office, for this work cannot be done just anywhere. The people must see that we really know how to govern, and anarchy and disorder should be avoided at all costs. No gendarmes or other such people should appear in the cities, but local and regional commands should be organized, and these should have their own partisans who should always bear the distinctive partisan emblem. They should set an example of discipline and justice, and protect the population. In the cities they should stabilize law and
order, ensure hygiene and food supplies, combat speculation, etc. You should do all these things, comrades, without getting caught up with trifles and forgetting your leading role. Do not think that now Berat is liberated we can allow any relaxation. Now more than ever relaxation will do us great harm. The military command should be active everywhere, striking at the enemy, and making every effort to consolidate and strengthen the state administration. Today more than ever, you should purge all bad elements, enemies of the people and the Party. Over military matters you have shown the same carelessness as on the question of the Party.

The General Staff has asked you for information on many things, but you have never answered. To report on the struggle against Isa Toska², or to disarm Italian soldiers is one thing, and to report on, and concern yourselves with, the organizational questions of the army, is another thing. On this second point it has never crossed your mind to report to the General Staff, and we expect the commissar of that group, comrade Gjin, to do this. We have written to you about the men you should send to the brigades, and the mobilization of the Kuçova workers, about arming them and sending them to an appointed place, but you have not written to us. You have not understood the importance of those matters, and your failure to carry them out, or your negligence, are wrecking all our plans. When we give an order to send men to the brigades, we consider that not only should you demonstrate your organizing abilities as communists, but you should at least inform the General Staff of what possibilities you have of doing this, so that the Staff will know how to act.

²War criminal, commander of a terrorist band in the service of the Italian occupiers.
The General Staff does not have one accurate report on the army in your region, on the cadres of your detachments, their weapons, or the morale and possibilities of the battalions and command there. We cannot expect all this information from anyone except the communists. All these things are closely interrelated, and failure to carry out one order cripples the whole apparatus which we are building, which requires us to display the greatest wisdom, cool-headedness, reliability, and above all, order in our work. You should always keep these things in mind if you want to make progress. You should carry them out, if you want our aims to become reality. Without orderly, disciplined work, and without being guided by clear-cut directives which apply to the whole of Albania, you will never be able to achieve any substantial results. The communists should be in the front ranks of the war. We have always said this, but the war is not waged only at gun point but also through the organization of the state administration and the army. For the organization of these two sectors the communists, and especially, the leading comrades, must be in the first ranks, and must be up to their tasks.

The situation that is developing is in our favour, but only if we are in a position to dominate it. Day by day the "Balli Kombëtar" is being discredited, and day by day we are gaining the ground it is losing, but we must not think that these victories are spontaneous; they need effort. The Tirana party organization should be taken as an example; it manages to publish lengthy daily communiques, proclamations, leaflets, and "Zëri i Popullit" and "Bashkimi", in such great number and so well printed that the entire population is astonished. And you should not forget that the Tirana comrades are working under the constant threat of the Gestapo. Such activity gives people great confi-
dence in our Party and comrades. The streets of Tirana where the Gestapo reigns, are covered every night with stickers printed by the most modern methods, stickers which popularize our heroic Party and the Soviet Union. And this work is so intensive that not a day passes without the population reading our leaflets or our newspapers. Our propaganda in this city has clearly brought out the rottenness of the “Balli Kombëtar” and its organizational weakness, for it is not enough to tell people that there is no hope for the “Balli Kombëtar”, but through our work we must make the people see for themselves that the “Balli Kombëtar” is in fact worthless. And the people of Tirana have understood this very clearly. Such an example should be followed by every region, especially by you who live and work in a liberated city. You have complained in the past, but now you have no reason to complain; all that is needed is work, and systematic work. None of our comrades has learned to do this at school, they have learned it in the course of the struggle. You are in the same situation, and so we require you to do unceasing work as good as that which is done in Tirana, or even better. You should have no hesitation about eliminating Ali Këlcyra and any other rotten element.

Devote the greatest attention to the army, consolidate it and raise its consciousness. The automatic weapons should always be in the hands of the Party. Telephone and telegraph communications should be in our hands. Repair the means of communication, and with the help of the Italian soldiers you have there, repair the telephone connections with all the liberated centers; keep in constant contact with the different localities in order to exchange experience with one another and to guide the comrades better. Regular and rapid communications are one of the main conditions for our victory.
Dear comrades,

We are sure that you will act as instructed on the matters about which we have written to you. Soon both you and we will have good results. If this does not happen, it will go hard with you.

Best regards
For the Central Committee of the Party

Shpati

Works, vol. 1.
LETTER ADDRESSED TO VUKMANOVICH TEMPO
IN ANSWER TO HIS SLANDEROUS ACCUSATIONS
AGAINST THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE GROUP OF
THE DIBRA REGION AND AGAINST THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
ALBANIA

October 29, 1943

Comrade Tempo,

Your letters have greatly astonished us; their tone is very rude and your judgement of our Central Committee is unjust. Nor do we think that our comrades there deserve the insulting assessment given by you and your Macedonian comrades. In such a difficult situation, it would not be surprising if they may have made some concession or may not have been in a position to utilize every favourable situation, but this is a far cry from labelling our comrades saboteurs and agents of “Great Albania”, and it seems to us that your accusations are very grave and quite outrageous. On the other hand, it does not seem to us that such a delicate matter should be judged with such lack of cool-headedness, nor that decisions should be taken or “orders” given without properly weighing up the situation and the moment. On the question of Dibra, this has been and is our opinion, and we have given the appropriate orders to the comrades who are working in that sector.
We do not accept the new boundaries established by the fascists. But what is the situation in Dibra? This is how it has been reported to us, and we believe the report to be true: in that town the Macedonians are the minority, and on the other hand, the influence of the Yugoslav Party is not very great because of its weak organization, and consequently the national liberation movement led by the Yugoslav Partisan Staff is not widespread, but is rather in the embryonic stage.

In Dibra and the surrounding region, apart from reaction and its forces, the only partisan detachment which makes its presence felt is that of Haxhi Lleshi, which day by day is growing stronger and gaining ground. Up to the capitulation of Italy and since then, Haxhi Lleshi’s battalion has been the only force which was able in some measure to cope with the forces of reaction, which are very numerous in Dibra. With the capitulation of Italy, all the reactionaries and their hordes went plundering and making a booty, and it was these hooligans who took the rifles. They were not given to them by Haxhi Lleshi (as Macedonian comrade Yanko writes in his letter), and this is the same Haxhi Lleshi, now accused of advocating “Great Albania”, who prevented the hordes of the bairaktars not only from taking possession of all the rifles, but also from committing other outrages. So, the capitulation of Italy found Dibra in a situation in which the sole force able to dominate the situation, if this were possible, was Haxhi’s partisan forces. The reactionaries were strong, their mercenary forces intact, and not only that, but there was no organized Macedonian force. In short, our position was not good (neither ours nor yours). How should Haxhi Lleshi have acted at that time? We did not and do not share your opinion. We maintain that the moment was not opportune (given the small forces which we had) to establish a Macedonian administration in Dibra, because
if we had done so, both we and you would have aroused the entire reaction against us. And not only the reaction, but also the people, who would have accused us of "selling out", and this would have had grave repercussions for the development of the struggle which both we and you are waging in that region. By doing this, Haxhi Lleshi and his partisans would have lost what prestige they had gained in Dibra. We gave Haxhi the directive for the formation of a national liberation administration, and that Macedonians, too, must be elected to the council, people who are actively devoted to the work and the war (and not addicted to preaching from the pulpit, as you say in your letter) in order to consolidate our positions (both ours and yours) and, through joint work, to strengthen our ranks, temper them, and strike at the reaction. For that moment, and until our position is strong enough to cope with any eventuality, we consider this the most appropriate way to act. We believe that to act in this way does not mean to advocate a "Great Albania!" We believe that the mentality of the Dibra population, and the geographical situation with regard to the former boundaries (the town of Dibra and the few villages which were under Yugoslav rule at that time, too, were completely linked with the part under Albanian rule, and even the Macedonians had very close links with the Albanians), all these things, are as well known to us as they are to you, and in this situation it seems to us that it would be harmful to apply the "correct line" through a decree or order. In any case, we still think that this is not such a simple problem.

Friendly greetings

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 1.

November 3, 1943

TO THE REGIONAL COMMITTEES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA

Dear comrades,

You know that for some time the situation has turned in favour of the anti-fascist coalition. The main factor in this change has been the heroic Red Army. Ever since Stalingrad, it has not given a moment’s respite to the German Army which is going from retreat to retreat, suffering one defeat after another, as it heads for disaster.

¹ A British-sponsored traitorous organization formed in November 1943 with the aim of alienating the Albanian people from the CPA and re-establishing in Albania the regime of former King Zog, by presenting it as the only “legal” regime. The chairman of the organization, Abaz Kupi, a spy of the British, a renegade of the National Liberation War, united his forces with those of the quisling government and of the “Balli Kombëtar”, and collaborated with the German occupiers.
The great Soviet offensive on the Dnieper is in full swing. The first great tactical successes are being fully exploited by Stalin’s brilliant strategy and the courageous Red Army. Germany is approaching a decisive defeat. Its reserves are no longer sufficient to cope with war on such vast fronts, and to face such critical situations. The successive military defeats have immeasurably lowered the morale of the German Army and of the German people, who are beginning to rise up against the nazis. The German Army, routed, worn out and bleeding, is now entering its third winter in Soviet territory. It will be confronted by fresh and well-trained Soviet troops who will continue to deal it more and more even heavier blows until its final destruction.

In this situation the opening of another vast front in Europe by the allies would speed up the collapse of Germany. You know that the Anglo-American contribution to this war has always been much smaller than that of the Soviet Union. The measures to be taken to hasten the end of the war, measures which imply much greater participation by the Anglo-American allies in the war, will undoubtedly have been one of the points discussed at the Moscow Conference.²

Hitler knows that he has lost the war militarily. Only a compromise can save him. That is why he is doing all he can to manoeuvre to mobilize international reaction. He has followed these tactics since his advent to power and, particularly, when he hoped to destroy the Red Army. But we must not forget that yesterday he used these tactics

² The Moscow Conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR, Great Britain and USA was held from the 19th to the 30th of October 1943, and proclaimed as the main task: to shorten the duration of the Second World War, to open the second front as soon as possible, to strengthen cooperation among the allies in the war, and to continue it after the war.
to attack, while today he is using them to defend himself, to save his neck. He is trying to activate the reaction in Britain and the United States, to link himself closely to it, and thus to influence the Anglo-American policy, to achieve a compromise which would ensure him part of his war spoils. But in order to give this manoeuvre time to develop and to convince the Anglo-American reaction that he would be a valuable ally, Hitler should not be in a position of great inferiority. This is one of the reasons why he is so fiercely obstinate in his stand on the Dnieper.

Already it is obvious that this manoeuvre of Hitler's has failed. It has failed because the people of Britain and America are becoming more and more involved in open struggle against internal reaction and its methods, and are a mighty force which is terrifying the reaction and making it hesitate. It has failed, because the Anglo-American policy cannot venture on to so dangerous an adventure. But it has failed, above all, because the Soviet offensives, especially that on the Dnieper, are breaking Hitler's back, strengthening the unity of the freedom-loving peoples, and increasingly mobilizing them against Germany and fascism.

Thus reaction cannot save itself under Hitler's flag. That is why it is preparing for a broad manoeuvre, which is already becoming obvious: it is a matter of preparing the ground to oppose the Red Army and the national liberation movements after the defeat the German Army is bound to suffer. This manoeuvre can be seen especially in the occupied countries, in Yugoslavia with Drazha Mihailovich, in Albania with the "Balli Kombëtar", and other groups; it is evident in the stand of the German allies, Rumania, Hungary and Finland.

What will be the stand of Britain and the United States towards this manoeuvre of reaction? First and foremost we must be aware that Britain and the United States are not trying to crush reaction in Europe, they only
want to take it over from Hitler. They still recognize Drazha Mihailovich, and even help him. The Sikorsky\(^3\) affair and the activities of the British mission in our country, show that they are trying to strengthen the reactionary movement and to mobilize it against the national liberation movements. This has undoubtedly been one of the points of discussion at the Moscow Conference.

Every day the national liberation movements in Europe are gaining more ground; the masses of the people are awakening and rallying around them.

In Italy, the reaction, headed by Badoglio and Victor Emmanuel III, and with the indirect support of the allied armies, is trying to establish its domination by other methods. In particular, it tries to attack the Italian Communist Party and drive it from the political scene, because it is the party with the strongest links with the masses, the party which can crush the reaction and lead the people towards setting up their state power. The efforts of the Italian people, and especially of the Italian Communist Party, pose an increasing threat to the reaction and force Badoglio to constantly change his methods.

The German occupiers have undertaken a large-scale campaign throughout Europe to mobilize reaction and snare the people with demagogical nationalist slogans aimed solely at inciting them to war against the national liberation movements. Throughout Europe, Hitler is organizing and preparing the struggle against the communist parties, against the establishment of the people's state power. The reaction is rallying round this slogan, this is the main weapon of the enemy, and this is what we must attack.

\(^3\) Reactionary Polish leader, head of the Polish government in exile in London (1939-1943), a servant of the imperialist Anglo-American circles.
In the Balkans, more than anywhere else, the enemies of the national liberation movements, headed by Hitler, are striving to take advantage of national antagonisms to strengthen the reactionary anti-communist front which Hitler calls the “Balkan Federation”. Instead of preparing to repel any eventual allied landing, it is fighting and will continue to fight the national liberation movements in the Balkans.

With the assistance of Albanian reactionaries, Hitler is trying to mobilize the Albanian population of Kosova and Macedonia against the Serbian-Montenegrine-Macedonian populations, and to use the Kosova problem to sow confusion among the Albanian people, to divide them, and to incite the pseudo-patriots to struggle against the national liberation movement of the Albanian people. With the help of the local chauvinists, he is trying to rally public opinion here to support the anti-Serbian and anti-Greek policy, which would lead us to armed conflicts with our neighbours, create splits in our national liberation movement, and lay the basis for the organization and strengthening of anti-communist, national-chauvinist parties hostile to the national liberation cause.

The approach of the end of the war against Germany and its stooges, on the one hand, and the strengthening of the Albanian National Liberation Army and our movement in general, on the other, have awakened our people and drawn them closer to our struggle. Everywhere in Albania sympathy towards us is increasing and our influence is becoming stronger. But this has spurred reaction also into very great activity, mobilizing itself and trying to rally the masses around it, in order to turn the situation to its favour.

You know what the “Balli Kombëtar” is and what it does, and you also know the stand we must take towards it. This is explained thoroughly in the Central Committee
circular of September 10, 1943 at which you should have another look. One thing is now quite clear, that the “Balli Kombëtar” collaborates with anyone and in every way possible against the national liberation movement, and in particular, it collaborates with the German occupiers. In Fier and Lushnja the “Balli Kombëtar” has taken command of the towns under the protection of German bayonets and is involving itself more and more in foul deeds and in perfidious war against us. Everywhere it is allying itself with the Germans to fight us with weapons, espionage, and propaganda. Apart from the role of Isa Toska, it also tries to maintain a semblance of independence from the German occupiers and to appear as if it is working underground against them, in order to prevent the people from recognizing it as a tool of the Gestapo, and thus preserve the credibility necessary to take over Hitler’s domination of Albania and to have more room to manoeuvre. The “Balli Kombëtar” is concerned to mobilize as many forces as possible, whoever they may be, to fight the Communist Party and the national liberation movement and to oppress the Albanian people today, but more particularly, tomorrow.

But the reaction sees that the “Balli Kombëtar” alone cannot fight our movement successfully, so it tries to organize and mobilize other forces under various flags. It pushes on to the scene new figures who enjoy a certain standing in the eyes of the public, people such as Mehdi Frashëri, or people like Zog who, having exercised power under the past regimes, still have influence in some regions.

This circular issued the directives of the CC of the CPA concerning the situation created after the capitulation of fascist Italy.
Our enemies intend to mobilize as many forces as possible around the reaction, and organize them as best they can into one or several groups, either within the Gestapo government or outside it, but against us, and solely against us. The tendency is for the reactionary groups to become centralized. At the moment, Mehdi Frashëri (and perhaps someone else later on) has emerged as one of the political figures around whom this activity has been focused. People who were directly at the service of Italian fascism, such as Mustafa Kruja, Kolë Biba, Gjon Marka Gjonin, Shefqet Verlaci and other reactionaries, whose forces are as large as any, are also included in this vast combined anti-national liberation manoeuvre.

The Zogites, led by Fiqri Dine and the North chiefs, have been very active recently. They are trying to organize themselves around the figure of Zog, to create a strong party and prepare the ground (and especially, the forces) for the restoration of Zog and his regime. The Germans, too, are playing the Zog card, for they have set up a “Regency Council”, re-established Zog’s constitution and returned confiscated property. The reaction, too, is playing the Zog card, reserving the right to discard it or play it more openly in the future. They have begun to use Zog as a bogey to turn the masses from the war, putting him up as the only person capable of “saving Albania

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5 One of the biggest feudal landowners of the country, agent of Italian fascism, prime minister of the 1st quisling government in Albania (1939-1941).

6 Zogite representative and quisling prime minister (July-August 1944).

7 In October 1943 the German occupiers convened in Tirana a “National Assembly” which, according to the orders of the Hitlerites, proclaimed the “separation of Albania from Italy” and rigged up a “Supreme Regency Council” with Mehdi Frashëri at the head. On November 5, the traitorous Regency nominated the quisling government with fascist Rexhep Mitrovica presiding.
from "anarchy", by which they mean rescuing reaction from our movement. The speeches of many Ballists and other reactionaries, who say that the communists will compel them to join with Zog, the articles of the newspaper "At dheu"8 ("Fatherland"), as well as the wide-scale publicity to boost Zog, are all part of a single manoeuvre aimed at mobilizing reaction around him.

The "Balli Kombëtar" and all reaction have a lot to say about anarchy, chaos, and the confusion occurring in our country, where, according to them, everyone is pulling in different directions. They want to accuse the national liberation movement and our Party of causing this anarchy, trying to present our Party as a party opposed to order, and which would bring only chaos and anarchy.

The German occupiers are endeavouring to give Albania the appearance of an independent country. This calls for a state apparatus in the hands of Albanians and an Albanian military force that would obediently serve Hitler and do his work, that is, fight energetically against the national liberation movement. But reaction has never been more afraid of our movement than today, and it has never been more united to fight us with all its forces. So it gladly accepts Hitler's helping hand, although it tries to conceal its links with the invader so that the destruction of fascism will not spell its own end. Reaction is trying to fight our movement and to strengthen itself during the German occupation, in order to be able to establish its domination more easily later on, for it, too, is convinced that Germany has lost the war.

Another manoeuvre, which the enemy and the reactionaries use and which you must have noticed at the grass-roots, concerns the question of unity which almost

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8 Principal organ of the traitorous "Legaliteti" organization (October 1943-August 1944).
everyone, from Mustafa Kruja to the “Balli Kombëtar”, is calling for. They are trying to mislead our people and the national liberation movement, and in particular, to blame our Communist Party for the lack of unity. This unity is being demanded on any conditions and with everyone: with Zog, the “Balli Kombëtar”, Mustafa Kruja, the “Executive Committee”, and the “Regency Council”, and even with the German nazis. This is the sort of unity the reaction is after. You are aware that this broad campaign of “fraternization” aims at turning the people away from the National Liberation War, and at disorientating them, at presenting the traitors as patriots, at wiping out our movement and having the people submit to the leadership of reaction. They campaign for the unity of the Albanian nationalists while trying to present the Communist Party of Albania as an alien party, and communism as an alien ideology, in merciless war with Albanian nationalism. Their aim is to lead the non-communist elements away from the national liberation movement, to isolate our Party, and more easily attack it by accusing it of being the cause of the discord, terror and fratricide. On top of all this, they are trying to present our Party as a party which is working against the national interests.

What stand should all party members take in this external and internal situation, and how should they act?

We must look to Moscow and view everything in the light of the struggle the Soviet Union is waging, particularly at present, following the tripartite Conference. We must be thoroughly familiar with the decisions adopted at the Moscow Conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR, Great Britain and USA.

9 It was created by the Hitlerite occupiers on September 14, 1943 as a “provisional government” of Albania and was made up of branded reactionaries, close collaborators of the Italian and German fascist occupiers with Ibrahim Bey Biçaku at the head.

10 The Moscow Conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR, Great Britain and USA.
at this conference and with Soviet policy, and scrupulously conform to them, for this is the only way we can avoid making mistakes during our struggle. We must widely popularize the Soviets and the gigantic struggle the Soviet Union is waging, and arouse our people's love and respect for the Soviet Union, the Red Army, and Stalin; our people should be made aware that it is the Soviet Union which will defend the interests and freedom of the smaller nations against any attack by reaction. We must work towards convincing our people that the Soviet Union is their most sincere ally. We need not be afraid of slipping to the left in popularizing the Soviet Union, but at the same time, we must be careful not to fall into provocations and produce results contrary to our aims.

We must popularize the national liberation struggles going on throughout Europe, and especially those in Yugoslavia and Greece. Openly and without hesitation, we must raise the problem of our brotherhood with the peoples of Yugoslavia and Greece. We must mercilessly expose reaction and chauvinism which are trying to push us into war with our neighbours. We must convince our people that the supreme interests of our country demand that, to fraternize with the Greek and Yugoslav peoples, we must tear the mask from chauvinism which tries to present itself as the defender of Albania against foreigners, and show the whole world that it is we, and we alone (the national liberation movement), that defend Albania against the occupiers and the foreign imperialists. We have to convince our people that the national liberation movements of Yugoslavia and Greece, far from endangering our independence, help us to win it.

About the "Balli Kombëtar". — In various circulars we have often said what the "Balli Kombëtar" is, and what our stand towards it should be. The "Balli Kombëtar" is a hot-bed of reaction, and must be fought without mercy.
The 2nd National Liberation Conference emphasized our stand in regard to uniting or cooperating with all those outside the National Liberation Front, and with the "Balli Kombëtar". Regarding people who have not compromised themselves or who have taken a wrong course in the past, but have now corrected themselves, our stand must be that defined in the resolution of the conference. The question of whether to unite or cooperate with the reaction or with the "Balli Kombëtar" as an organization does not arise; the question is how to combat them. The "Balli Kombëtar", and every other organization outside the national liberation movement, have merged with reaction. In struggling against reaction you must try to create differentiation in its ranks, drawing those who leave it close to us. The main thing is to separate reaction from the people, and to prepare the people to struggle against it. Our correct and determined stand against reaction must not lead us to sectarianism, into scorning misled elements who acknowledge their mistakes, and lumping them together with the reactionaries. In the ranks of the "Balli Kombëtar" and reaction in general, there are many people who are confused, victims who do not understand the significance of our struggle against the internal and external enemies. It is our task to enlighten them, to draw them closer to our position, and with our correct attitude which excludes both sectarianism and compromise, to separate them from reaction once and for all. We must do everything we can to compel them to take a definite stand and abandon their attitude of waiting for the "appropriate moment", either to join the struggle against the invader or to attack us from behind. With these elements we should not be satisfied with platonic friendship and fine words, for this would only help them gain time, maintain their "wait-and-see" attitude, benefit from our support, and tomorrow, with their "good name" intact in the eyes of the
people, manoeuvre at our expense. But you must not understand our attitude as an effort to push them into the arms of reaction. On the contrary, it must enable those who still have not made up their minds and who do not have a clear idea about the situation, to understand that they should abandon their "wait-and-see" attitude, which benefits no one but the enemy.

In order to obtain these results we must make the people clear about our attitude, the viewpoint of the Party, and its political line. The people must be told what the Party has done and what it is doing. We must widely popularize our heroic Party and the sacrifices it has made for the liberation of the country; we must point out its leading role in this National Liberation War, the increased morale and determination of our people, the drive and heroism the Party has aroused among the Albanian youth, and its model spirit of sacrifice and organization. Similarly, it should be made clear to the people what the national liberation movement is, what the national liberation councils and the National Liberation Army are; the people must be made clear about the aims the enemy and the reaction are pursuing by identifying the national liberation movement with the Communist Party. You must try to expand the National Liberation Front and gather into it almost all the people, those who are honest and with a heart to fight, who cherish their homeland and freedom. Thus you can convince the people, and they will see concretely that the Front comprises all those who are fighting for the interests of Albania and to bury the occupiers. Outside the Front, there might be some well intentioned individuals who want to serve the national cause. Nevertheless, by remaining outside the Front, they do not serve it, but harm it instead; as for the political groups and parties that remain outside the Front, they should be fought as reactionary parties which, directly or indirectly,
are playing the game of the occupiers, because reaction, in order to mislead democratically-minded elements and lead them away from the national liberation movement or to prevent them from joining this movement, is attempting to enter the political scene through a puppet "social-democratic" party. "Balli Kombëtar" elements, such as Skënder Muço, renegades from the national liberation struggle, such as Sotir Kondi, and other agents of the reaction are doing their best to set up such parties, but they dare not come out into the open.

The people must be made well aware that the reaction is a tool of the enemy. We must prevent reaction from giving the people the impression that the struggle between us is merely over ideological questions; we fight reaction, first, because it is from head to heels in the service of the occupiers and, second, because it is working to perpetuate the anti-popular regimes. Our struggle against the reaction is an inseparable part of the struggle against the occupiers. You must point out to the people that the reaction's campaign for so-called unity is rotten demagogy, that it is we who want genuine unity and work for this unity, and that outside the National Liberation War there is not and can be no unity. We must take great pains to do everything in our power to expose the reactionaries and their movement, and expose them as splitters, terrorists, and murderers of their own brothers. We must point out to the people that the "order" the reaction wants is that of foreign occupation, of the bayonets of the militia and the whip of spies. They are doing their utmost, employing criminals and finding other vile methods, to plunge the country into chaos and anarchy, to exhaust the people.
people, to deceive them and impose their will, in other words, the blackest terror. When our units were the only formations in the Albanian mountains, theft, blood-feuds and disturbances began to disappear, and our peasants began to live in a security they had never known before. But with the appearance of the bands of the “Balli Kombëtar”, crime, theft and other disturbances began again; and it could not have been otherwise, for they had come out to bring the chaos and anarchy, which are great enemies of the national liberation movement. This is the truth, not the opposite that the reactionaries would have us believe.

We must take a clear-cut stand towards Zog and the Zogites. They have begun to move, some individually, others in a more or less organized form; some want to come into the National Liberation Front, while others, such as Bazi i Canës, have been members of the Front for a long time and have taken a vacillating stand. It is rumoured that some sort of a Zogite party has been founded with Bazi, and of course, all the other bankrupt elements, bayraktars and parasites of the Zog regime, and the reactionaries who are abandoning the sinking ship of the “Balli Kombëtar”. It is said that this party will seek to enter the National Liberation Front. We categorically and clearly declare to all the Zogites, whether organized or not, and to Zog himself, that before they can enter the national liberation movement, they must totally accept the line of the National Liberation General Council, they must renounce all their lost privileges and thoroughly realize that the past has gone forever, they must not raise the question of the regime, but fight for a free, democratic and popular Albania in which the people themselves will choose the regime they want. They must renounce all their pretensions and desist from their intrigues as well. They must come out openly in the fight against all reactionaries.
and enemies of the liberation war being waged by the Albanian people. This is our answer to the Zogites. But we cannot waste time holding discussions with them; it is clear that they are preparing to start their struggle; the reactionaries, exposed in the "Balli Kombëtar", are trying to find other banners under which to fight the national liberation movement, either from within or from outside it. For this reason let us begin to expose them and struggle against them, revealing them to the people in their true light, for they have never done anything to oppose the occupiers, but on the contrary, openly or indirectly, they have collaborated with them, and now they want to take advantage of our struggle to re-establish their regime of slavery! We must not hesitate to use armed force against those who try to hinder our war (as, for example, in Dibra, where our forces have dealt a telling blow to the Zogites). Wide-scale agitation against the Zogites should be carried on among the people, but until a further directive is issued, Bazi i Canës' name should not be mentioned in our leaflets and communiques.\textsuperscript{12} But this should not prevent you from exposing the newspaper "Atdheu", and the manoeuvres of Zogism and the Zogites in your areas; neither should it prevent you from preparing the ground for a large-scale campaign and an open struggle against Zog, from speaking out against Musa Juka\textsuperscript{13} and his likes or from encouraging anti-Zogite feelings among the people.

Of course there will always be divergencies in the ranks of reaction, but we must not rely too much on them, for the fiercest opposition and hostility of the reactionaries

\textsuperscript{12} At that time the National Liberation General Council had not yet expelled Abaz Kupi (Bazi i Canës) from its ranks, and had invited him to a meeting to clarify his position.

\textsuperscript{13} Former minister of home affairs in Zog's government. He crushed in blood every progressive movement.
are directed against us, and not against one another. However, this does not mean that we must not take advantage of their divergencies.

It is through political struggle against the reaction, through armed struggle against the reactionary armed forces and, in the first place, against the occupiers, that the people will mobilize increasingly around us, will become more conscious of the significance of the National Liberation War, and truly make it their own. For this reason we must take the greatest care that we are not alone in either the political struggle or the armed struggle against reaction, but must take the people with us, otherwise the people will remain neutral and can easily be influenced by the enemy. The German occupiers and their stooges are trying to persuade our people that Albania is not an occupied country, and to make them forget that the German army is here. This is a danger to us because it turns the people away from the war. Besides the armed struggle against the Germans, we must also conduct a wider and deeper struggle against the nazi demagogy. We must fight the Assembly, the committees, commissions, councils, everything the Germans have set up. We must expose and wage a determined struggle against such traitors as Mehdi Frashëri, Fuat Dibra, Father Anton Harapi, Lef Nosi and others, and point out to the people that these alleged nationalists are agents of the Gestapo, and have not, as they claim, shouldered this task merely because they were forced to do so by the Germans, or for "the good of the country". Using the traitors as their mouthpieces, the Germans tell us that they leave us alone, and so we should leave them alone. To accept this line of action would be a compromise, a denial of the National Liberation War, and would mean the destruction of our
movement and the strengthening of the position of reaction. Therefore, we must keep the people in constant struggle against the occupiers, and do everything possible to kindle hatred of them.

On the question of the national liberation councils. Recently you were sent the resolution of the 2nd National Liberation Conference as well as the Constitution and Rules of the national liberation councils. Whenever the Central Committee has sent letters or directives, it has laid particular emphasis on the importance of the national liberation councils, their role in this war, and the way to work in them. We advise you to study these resolutions, regulations and circulars carefully and apply them in your areas so that sound concrete results are obtained, for you must clearly understand that the national liberation councils are not just formal organizations, but the foundations of the democratic régime and the true organs of the National Liberation War. In spite of the advice and instructions you have been given, the results hoped for have not been obtained; in many places there are still no councils, while in others they exist only formally. It goes without saying that wherever the councils are in this situation, the reaction moves in and makes its nest, while wherever these councils have been set up on the basis of the Constitution and Rules, the entire population takes part in them, participates in the war and gives it every assistance. For the national liberation councils to run smoothly, comrades should be appointed to engage in this work, and devote the greatest attention to it. Apart from setting up these councils, the comrades should give them vigour and life. They should give the councils the benefit

15 These had been drafted and approved at the 2nd National Liberation Conference (September 4, 1943), and outlined the organizational forms and tasks of the new organs of the state power.
of their experience and determination, and help and encourage all the nationalist elements to participate in the activities of the councils, making these elements conscious of the task with which the people have charged them. The national liberation council should mobilize the entire people, and become a strong organ with a healthy organizational apparatus. Councils should be set up in every village, commune, subprefecture and region, and be closely linked with the National Liberation General Council from which they will receive instructions and directives, and to which they should periodically send detailed reports on their activities and on the political situation of their regions. As has been emphasized in previous circulars, for these councils to function properly, various sectors should be formed within them, and these sectors, headed by a competent person, should organize the work embracing the entire social and political life of the village or town. First of all, the councils should collect aid for our army, and launch winter supply campaigns for the severe winter our fighters will have to face in the mountains. With cash donations we must be careful to see that they don’t go into the wrong pocket: funds for the National Liberation War are to go to the councils, which will hand them over to the General Staff of the army, and only aid for the Party is to go to the Party Fund. Particular attention must be paid to this, because the accounts must be accurate. The directives issued by the National Liberation General Council should be studied in the councils by the party comrades who will explain them so they can be implemented, not by decree or force, but through conviction. The publications sent by the National Liberation General Council, such as leaflets or the newspaper “Bashkimi”\(^\text{16}\),

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\(^{16}\) Organ of the National Liberation General Council, which began its publication in March 1943.
should be circulated throughout the whole of Albania, should be duplicated and studied thoroughly. To strengthen the national liberation councils is to assist our war, to speed up the liberation of our people and country.

On the question of the Albanian Anti-fascist Women's Union. — With the authorization of the Central Committee an initiative was taken, and a circular sent to all the regional committees recommending that they begin working to set up the Albanian Anti-fascist Women's Union. This must be a real organization, and not just a beautiful name to be mentioned at conferences. The role of women in the war is enormous, and the present war, with all its sacrifices, has brought this out. That is why you must work with them as you work with any other organization. You must build up this organization from the foundations and consolidate it, activating councils of anti-fascist women in city suburbs, towns, and villages. The setting up of these councils should be carried out as soon as possible, and not remain just a good intention. Our women comrades should devote most of their efforts to setting up and strengthening a healthy organizational apparatus of the anti-fascist women. The sooner these councils are set up, the sooner the National Conference of the Albanian Anti-fascist Women's Union can be called. Therefore you should see to it that regional councils are elected at regional conferences, and that delegates are appointed to the National Conference. With the approval of the 2nd National Liberation Conference, the Tirana Council of Anti-fascist Women has undertaken to organize this conference.

17 Circular of the CC of the CPA in connection with the formation of the Albanian Anti-fascist Women's Union, dated April 14, 1943 (See this vol. p. 121).
On the question of the Albanian People's Anti-fascist Youth Union. — A circular of the Central Committee of the Youth to the regional youth committees clearly explains what this organization is, why it was formed, and how it functions. Study this circular well. The greatest assistance must be given to help the regional committees of the youth organize regional conferences of the Anti-fascist Youth Union which will elect regional committees and delegates to a National Conference. The Anti-fascist Youth Union, within the limits of its possibilities, will send its delegates to the regional conferences. But do not wait; hold the conferences as soon as possible, with one or more delegates of the local national liberation council attending; if the delegate of the Anti-fascist Youth comes, all the better, but if not, carry on the work.

See to it that the comrades of the youth organization whom you send to units or brigades, are accompanied by a note on their work and capabilities, and advise the comrades of the units of each group or zone to assign suitable tasks to them so that the comrades capable of leading the youth work are not loaded with tasks just as easily done by an ordinary partisan.

All the party comrades are responsible for seeing that the work with the youth goes smoothly; any lack of interest on your part could alienate the youth from the Party. But this interest should not be narrowly understood; it does not mean perfunctory bureaucratic control; it means you must study and make yourself familiar with the organizational line of the youth, with its problems and needs in your region, helping and advising it, giving it instructions, encouraging it to work and utilizing it in the

18 Circular of the CC of the Communist Youth of Albania "On the Formation of the Albanian People's Anti-fascist Youth Union", dated September 20, 1943.
best possible way to strengthen our Party and the National Liberation War. Unfortunately, it is evident that your interest in the youth has been mostly formal. It is absolutely essential that this situation be improved; the reports you send us should speak concretely about the youth, demonstrating your interest and competence.

On the National Liberation Army. — The main problem of the National Liberation War is that of strengthening our army. Alongside the problem of the organization of the Party, the question of the army should concern all the leading comrades and all party members. These two questions are closely connected, but here we will confine ourselves to some observations on the military problem. The battalions stationed in your region should always be on the offensive against the foreign and local enemy, and at the same time, you should raise the political level of our soldiers to make them aware of the significance of the war they are fighting. On the other hand, you should mobilize the people, not with the aim of recruiting unsuitable elements, who will desert at the first confrontation with the enemy, but bringing into our army peasants and workers who have the struggle for liberation close to their hearts. We must choose capable, courageous, and honest leaders for our army. It is impermissible for elements who might discredit or hamper our war to hold leading posts. You must recruit the soundest and bravest elements from the battalions to form the brigades, upon receiving order to do this from the General Staff of the National Liberation Army. There is an element of bureaucracy in our army, which must be eliminated, because it hinders the development of the war and gives some partisan comrades a justification for their slothfulness. This, on the other hand, slows down the rhythm of the war which should always maintain the character of a mobile guerrilla war. In some regions, our army has to
some extent lost that hardness it should have in the war, while in other places some units and battalions, instead of always being where they can attack the enemy, try to bed themselves down in winter quarters. In order to have a strong army, it is essential for you to set up party organizations in the army, and for the party members to be the leaders who give this army fire and vitality. Up to now we have not seen these directives taken with the necessary seriousness or carried out. You have worked hard on military problems and have mobilized the masses, but the effect of this will be lost if the indispensable party leadership is lacking. It is not enough just to have party cells in the battalions and units (as is the sad reality), but these cells must really carry out their task. Often, the party comrades in the army, instead of organizing various conferences and courses, only deal with minor matters, acting as couriers and buying goods for the units, jobs which could just as easily be done by ordinary partisans. This situation must be done away with. Don't let us hear again the commissars and vice-commissars justify their inactivity by claiming that they could not call a party cell meeting or hold a conference because they have been on the march and other such excuses. Movement is the very nature of our war, therefore party members cannot use such excuses to justify failure to fulfil their tasks. Our comrades must be advised to uphold the name of the Party and raise its prestige among the partisans, to be severe towards all party members, especially towards commissars and vice-commissars, if they fail in their duties. The cells in battalions and bureaus of staffs must be on the look-out so that any sign of weakness on the part of a party member is not allowed to pass without reprimand and correction. Our comrades in the army should set an example for the others. Proof that the regional committees have neglected the organization of the
Party in the army is that the number of party members in this sector is not increasing; such a great source of party members, such a source of determined and experienced fighters as the sector of the army, has dried up. Brigades are being formed with various elements from every part of the country, but there is a shortage of party members, because there are not enough in the army. To fill this gap we are obliged to take cadres from the cities. We are telling you this to show that very little work has been done in the army, a sector from which the Party has the greatest hopes of recruiting more members of peasant origin. At this moment, mobilization is on the agenda and must be done systematically. First, the regional committee should study the question of which party members should go into the army. In doing this you should keep in mind that while you must keep some very sound and capable cadres in the cities to do the work there in the event of a reaction on the part of the enemy, you should not sacrifice all of them. Some of these cadres should be sent to the army, with particular tasks and instructions. At the same time the importance of the mobilization and of how it should be done must be explained to the cells; the leaders of the youth organizations, the national liberation councils, and the education groups should be prepared for large-scale mobilization campaigns. The main point to be raised at the broad meetings of the people of towns and villages, and at the youth conferences is that of strengthening the army and the mobilization. At these conferences and meetings, those who are ready to join the units, and especially our party comrades and the youth organization members, should get up at the end of the discussion and say that they are going to join the army, inviting others to go with them. Campaigns should be launched to recruit for the brigades, particularly from among young people of the towns. You must understand once and for
all that without an organized army, and especially, without strong brigades, we cannot wage a serious war against the occupiers, cannot mobilize all the Albanian people, cannot break reaction's head. When the General Staff asks for people for the various brigades that have been formed, the comrades there, instead of sending the best and most militant people, as the directives call for, send those it suits them to send. This shows that the party comrades do not appreciate, or underestimate the importance of the brigades, the genuine formations of our regular army, which little by little will absorb all the sound elements to eventually create our real army. In general the comrades at the grass-roots look at this question narrowly, not seeing beyond their own area. Fearing that their own areas will be weakened, they do not appreciate the great value of the brigades, which, if they are formed with elements one hundred percent determined, will be able to work wonders and assist in every way in all the various zones they pass through. That is why the best comrades must be sent to the army and, especially, to the brigades. In general, our army needs hand-picked commissars, vice-commissars and comrades capable of raising the level of the army, increasing the number of party cells in its ranks and strengthening them, in order to prevent a recurrence of the regrettable situation where the cells in the army are cells in name only. Do not keep too many comrades in the cities, but sent them to the army. In the cities, with just a few resolute comrades, a youth organization, an organization of anti-fascist women, and the national liberation councils, things will undoubtedly go well. In such a rallying point as the army it is a crime not to have party members, not to have cells, not to have an organization. It is necessary for the comrades responsible for areas of work, such as the members of the regional committees, the organizational or political secretaries, to
promote young comrades as soon as possible as their replacements, because they themselves will soon be needed in the army. We must take a decision on this point, and not let things drag on.

A circular\textsuperscript{19} of the Central Committee to all the political vice-commissars of the various units of the National Liberation Army points out their task and the care that must be taken to organize the Party in the army. In particular, it recommends that you read and study the Report on the National Liberation Army\textsuperscript{20} which should be duplicated and put in the hands of all party members. At other times it has been stressed that party work in the army does not come under the regional committees. With regard to the brigades, this remains precisely true, but as far as the battalions and the units of groups or zones are concerned, it should not be understood too rigidly. The organization of the Party in these units is responsible to the Central Committee, receiving directives from it and sending its reports through the commissar of the General Staff, but it still maintains contact with the regional committee of the zone and receives its assistance, because they have a lot of tasks in common.

\textit{Internal questions of the Party.}—Every letter to you has stressed the importance of the organization of the Party, but in the organizations we no longer see the enthusiasm and care previously shown on this very important question. It has been pushed into second place, and this is a great mistake, because we must be aware that without a strong, very well organized party, with sound and educated cadres who have emerged from the struggle, we

\textsuperscript{19} Instruction of the CC of the CPA, dated September 23, 1943, to all political vice-commissars of units, battalions and brigades of the ANLA concerning the strengthening of the party organizations in the army.

\textsuperscript{20} Report to the 1st National Conference of the CPA.
cannot expect good results. Neither the army, nor the youth organization, nor the other anti-fascist organizations can be up to the mark if the Party is organizationally weak. Everyone, from the leading comrades to the cell members and the members of the groups of sympathizers, should give themselves a good shake and look at the work and the situation more concretely. Our Party has an enormous responsibility, and in order to be able to shoulder it and emerge victorious, it must have a solid backbone, it must be a strong and well organized Party, and have comrades of a high political and military level, who at such decisive moments and in such difficult situations are capable of finding their bearings and coping with the unexpected. This is why the leading comrades should consistently help the other comrades of the cells, raise their political and theoretical level, assign them tasks of responsibility and demand results. As well as developing and extending the work in hand, you should find new methods of work, because this is the only way you can cope with the essential tasks you are faced with. It is no longer a question of minor work such as when the regional committee meetings discussed half a dozen reports received from party cells. Now broad horizons of work are opening before you. For this reason you must divide it, forming a network of comrades, sympathizers and friends around each responsible comrade so that, together, you can do the work you have been assigned by the regional committee meeting. Different sections should be set up for the press and propaganda, finance, the army, etc.

The greatest importance must be attached to the press and propaganda. Communiques, leaflets, and newspapers should be printed very carefully and distributed everywhere among the people. The propaganda section should always be on its toes, exposing every enemy manoeuvre and explaining the situation to the comrades and the
public. These materials must be attentively studied in the cells and groups, for it is there that the comrades will learn the political stand of our struggle and our Party. Pamphlets and books should be duplicated, especially the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B)". Not only must this book be put into the hands of all party members, but conferences and courses on it should be organized as well. Such work will raise the political level of our comrades and arm them with the most powerful weapon: Marxist theory.

Nothing has been heard about the situation of the party finances. It seems that they have been mixed up with the national liberation fund. This is a mistake, and it should be corrected as soon as possible. Party dues and contributions collected for the Party must go into the party treasury. It doesn't matter if they are spent on the needs of the army, but it is essential that the Party's financial contribution to the war be made known. Campaigns to collect money for the Communist Party have been completely neglected. Such campaigns should be undertaken, for they are a means of propaganda as well.

The work with the nationalists, which is particularly delicate, should be entrusted to good comrades who know how to present the line of the National Liberation War, how to tackle difficult situations and how to inject life into the national liberation councils. The organizations of the Youth and of the Anti-fascist Women must be given serious assistance and in no way be underestimated, because when we have a strong national liberation council, youth council, and women's council in a suburb, then we have mobilized the whole suburb and launched it into the struggle. And it is there that the soundness of the Party in the organizational field will be felt.

**Work with the British missions:** In many regions there are British missions which try to poke their noses
into our political affairs, and particularly into our internal organizational and military affairs. They are trying to unite with the reactionaries, to organize them in order to use them in the event of a landing here. The British officers carry out this activity sometimes openly and sometimes secretly. They need a strong movement which has credibility among the people, and therefore they are trying to raise the prestige of the “Balli Kombëtar”, to involve it in the war against the Germans so as to have it as a support in the future. But we must not forget that their primary interest should be the war against the Germans, a war which, here in Albania, is being fought by the national liberation movement alone, and therefore, they are obliged to help our movement. We must behave correctly towards them, at the same time taking a clear-cut stand. They must not be permitted to interfere in our internal affairs, and must in no way be accepted as arbitrators between us and the reaction. If our struggle against the reaction is to their liking, so much the better, otherwise nobody is forcing them to stay. If you find out that the British officers are up to trickery, if you have facts or documents concerning this, you must inform the General Staff immediately, and if it is a serious matter which cannot wait, escort them to the Command of the British missions in Albania (via our General Staff); by no means should they be allowed to meddle in our affairs, in our army.

* * *

The letters or reports to the General Staff, the General Council, the Anti-fascist Women and the Anti-fascist Youth should relate only to the competence of each, and you should avoid, for example, writing to the General Staff about party problems, or addressing the same letter to the General Staff and the Central Committee of the
Party, as often happens. Letters should be clearly addressed.

Once again we recommend that you take the greatest care that the circulars and letters of the Central Committee do not fall into the hands of the enemy; neither should the enemy find out their contents. The circulars and letters should enable you to define the line and tactics to follow in your work within the organization, among the people and against the enemy. This does not mean that, if speaking to the people, you should repeat the circulars word for word. We again stress that all the members of the regional committee should read the circulars and letters of the Central Committee carefully and, if possible, meetings of the activists of the region or at least of the town or district should be held from time to time to study the materials. Whatever happens, the word of the Central Committee should be conveyed to all the cells, and its directives studied.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania
Shpati

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LETTER TO THE BERAT REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA CONDEMNING THE WEAK CONTACTS WITH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMPROMISE WITH THE GERMANS IN BERAT

November 5, 1943

Dear comrades,

We received your undated report together with your excuses for the lateness of the reports. Communists never look for excuses, but carry out the tasks entrusted to them with precision. We have never seen reports from the Berat comrades properly compiled or on time. Following two or three months' silence you send us a report, full of apologies for its delay. Such methods of work must be ended once and for all, or measures, and very severe ones at that, will be taken against you. Your style of work and of maintaining contact with the Central Committee will be held up to all organizations as a negative example, to prevent its repetition.

The compromise with the Germans¹ is one of the worst deeds a party regional committee could ever have

¹During the period September-October 1943 Gjin Marku, the partisan commander of the Berat region, without the knowledge of the General Staff and in opposition to the party line, gave free access to the German forces to Berat which had been previously liberated by the forces of the National Liberation Army. This act was severely condemned by the Party, and Gjin Marku expelled from the CC of the CPA.
perpetrated. We could have expected almost anything, but such a thing we never expected from you. This is what results from break-downs in communications with the Central Committee. Your compromise with the Germans will be one of the topics for discussion at the next meeting of the Central Committee, at which decisions will be taken on this question.

Concerning the question of Fier, this is connected with that of Vlora, and is not as complicated as you make out. In case you have any surplus propaganda material, which we doubt, this should not prevent you from sending it to them.

The circular we are sending you should be studied with the greatest attention in the regional committee, and all its members should take part, including Gjin Marku, who should be summoned precisely for this purpose.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 2.
LETTER TO THE POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE BÈRZESHTA BATTALION ON PROVISION OF FOOD AND RAISING THE MILITANT SPIRIT OF THE BATTALION

November 8, 1943

TO COMRADE HILMI SELENICA
POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE PARTISAN BATTALION BÈRZESHTA

Dear comrade,

The General Staff has let us know about all your battalion’s requests. In this letter we wish to explain some questions concerning the battalion to you, and these explanations you must convey only to the party comrades. First of all there is the question of provisions. The party comrades in particular must be quite clear that ours is a mobile partisan war, and at the same time they must bear in mind that this war is being waged by the Albanian people, and mainly by the poor. Our movement has no other source of supply for the battalions and units, except aid from the people. In your letter to the command, you even ask for plates and ladles. We do not consider your requests either excessive or exaggerated, but one thing you should know is that the General Staff is not in a position to supply you even with knives. You should try to find such things among the people, and if you cannot find
them, then try to do without them. The tone of your letter indicates that your battalion envisages the need to prepare winter quarters — that is, to lay in stores, because the snow is coming and the roads will be blocked. True, it snows. The Staff will see about the wheat and bread for the battalion, but only for the most critical moments in winter. You should not think even for a moment that you have only to notify the Staff, and everything will be handed to you on a plate. Comrades, you should realize that we are poor, and that our chief weapon in this war is our strong, steel-like will. You should bear in mind that the winter will be severe for us who are fighting in the mountains, but this should not frighten us in the least, for we have experienced other such winters before; you should be the inspiration of the detachment, the inspiration of all the partisans and should, without fail, prepare the partisans to overcome every obstacle. They should know and understand that the war is not waged without sacrifice, that sometimes we may have to go without food for a day or two, and that we will be cold in the mountains. The true fighters, those fighting for our sacred ideal, will stand out in these difficult moments. We cannot achieve our aim at one blow. This is why you, party comrades, and especially you personally as political commissar of the battalion, as well as the vice-commissar, should always be alert to convince the fighters of the situation, and prevent the development in your detachment of an atmosphere of waiting for the things which have been ordered, as though it is not possible to wage the war or get through the winter without them. The General Staff will certainly answer your letters, but in your battalion you must teach the partisans and the commander to be guided in this spirit and to think in this way.

The next matter and the more important one is the work you have to do in the battalion. This is of extraor-
dinary importance, for on it depends the strength of the battalion, its progress, determination and steeling.

If you party members do not work properly within it, the battalion will be only a battalion on paper; if you do not raise the political and military level of the partisans you lead, the battalion will not be able to fulfil the mission the people have entrusted it with. The blame will fall on you alone, you will be responsible. This is no easy job, it is true, but for us communists there are no obstacles, because with our steel-like determination we must overcome them all. You are young, but you have great will-power and courage; in war, in battle you will accumulate the experience of the true communist fighter, for that is our great school. All of you, especially you personally and the vice-commissar, must always be ready to lead the battalion, and counsel the partisans. Once or twice a week you should gather the battalion or the inhabitants of the village or region where you are stationed, to hold a conference in which you explain everything in clear terms, whether it be political or military matters, or some local problem. Divide the work among the other party comrades, and have all the comrades report to the cell on the results. Anyone who does not do his duty as a genuine soldier of the Party, betrays the Communist Party and our people. The party comrades must be in the forefront of the struggle and of sacrifice; it is absolutely impermissible for the commissars and vice-commissars to behave like bosses and high-ranking functionaries. Although the Party has charged them with a truly heavy burden of great importance, their behaviour and attitude must be modest, for the prestige of their office rests on their modesty and on their rigorous performance of their duties.

You should bear in mind that your battalion must earn the title of Partisan Battalion. It must have the spirit of attack, must always be on the alert against the
enemy and the traitors, and be a real organizer of all the
councils of that region. Avoid passivity and tendencies to
remain at the base. Such tactics deaden the spirit of the
battalion. Such a battalion becomes stiff in the joints, and
does not deserve the title of Partisan Battalion. Avoid
bureaucracy in your ranks. If you manage to fulfill these
tasks and all the other tasks as specified in the booklet
"The National Liberation Army", which you must surely
have received and studied, then you will soon see the
fruit of your efforts. You will have a battalion which will
be the terror of the enemy and the traitors, and you will
have fulfilled the difficult tasks entrusted to you by our
beloved Party, for which all of you are ready to shed the
last drop of your blood.

Best regards
For the Central Committee of the Party

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 2.